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Victims’ Participation at the 
International Criminal Court: Are 
Concessions of the Court Clouding 
the Promise? 
By Christine H. Chung∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 No single legal issue at the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”) has garnered as much attention as the manner in which the 
ICC judges have interpreted the right of victims to participate in 
proceedings.  It was a major innovation—many would say the ma-
jor innovation—of the Court to grant to victims a right they had 
never previously enjoyed in any prior international criminal tribu-
nal: the right to participate in court proceedings by expressing 
“views and concerns” through their own legal representatives.  The 
first decision on the topic issued by the ICC judges, in January 
2006, established that the unprecedented right would be interpreted 
expansively.  Pre-Trial Chamber I held that victims would be 
granted a general right to participate in the investigation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), in addition to any future 
case, while conceding that the Rome Statute—the treaty which 
created the ICC—nowhere  expressly required the granting of this 
general right.  Since that decision, the Pre-Trial and Trial Cham-
bers of the ICC have continued to endorse a broad approach to 
permitting victims’ participation, while failing to reach agreement 
on the boundaries of that participation, or the standards by which 
applications to participate should be evaluated. 
¶2 The end of 2007 saw two significant developments.  First, 
there was growing evidence, noted also by observers outside the 
ICC, that the system of victims’ participation established in the 
                                                 
∗ The author is a Senior Fellow at the Schell Center for International Human 
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early decisions of the Court might be failing in its most central ob-
jective of providing effective participation to victims.  Specifically, 
the first five hundred or so applications to participate in investiga-
tion and pre-trial proceedings had jammed in the machinery of the 
proceedings.  These hundreds of applications were submitted by 
individuals among the massive numbers of victims of the conflicts 
under investigation by the ICC: in the Darfur region of The Sudan, 
the DRC, northern Uganda and the Central African Republic 
(“CAR”).  The record of proceedings showed that applicants typi-
cally waited for over a year to learn whether they would obtain the 
“status of victim,” a status which conferred only eligibility to par-
ticipate in specific proceedings.  Less than a hundred victims had 
obtained even this theoretical right to participate nearly two years 
after the first decision on victims’ participation.  From those eligi-
ble to participate, moreover, less than a handful of applicants had 
meaningfully participated in any specific ICC proceeding. 
¶3 On January 23, 2008, two years after the first decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, came the second development.  Noting that 
various Chambers of the Court had interpreted the relevant provi-
sions of the Rome Statute, the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence (“RPE”), and the Regulations of the ICC “in a significantly 
different manner,” pre-trial judges assigned to the Darfur and DRC 
situations granted leave to appeal the question of whether they had 
correctly interpreted the governing rules to permit them to grant a 
“procedural status of victim,” or the theoretical right to participate, 
during the investigative and pre-trial stages of proceedings.1  The 
judges also sought, rather poignantly, given the persistent backlog 
of applications to participate, Appeals Chamber review on the 
question of: “how applications for participation at the investigation 
                                                 
1 See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-118, Decision on Re-
quest for Leave to Appeal the “Decision on the Requests of the OPCD on the 
Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 
86(2)(e) of the Regulations of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory 
Materials by the Prosecutor,” Public, 7-8 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 23, 2008) 
[hereinafter First Darfur Grant of Appeal]; Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Situation No. ICC-01/04-438, Decision on Request for Leave to 
Appeal the “Decision on the Requests of the OPCD on the Production of Rele-
vant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the Regula-
tions of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the Prose-
cutor,” Public, 7-8  (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter First DRC 
Grant of Appeal].     
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stage of a situation and the pre-trial stage of a case must be dealt 
with.”2 
¶4 One ICC judge has cautioned against activism in broadening 
the victims’ participation right granted by the Rome Statute.  On 
January 18, 2008, the Trial Chamber assigned to conduct the ICC’s 
first trial ruled that victims of any crime committed in the DRC 
and within the jurisdiction of the Court could potentially partici-
pate in the trial, although the trial itself involves only a single for-
mer DRC militia leader, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (“Lubanga”), who 
faces charges of child conscription, child enlistment, and use of 
children in hostilities.3  Writing in dissent, the Honorable René 
Blattman reasoned primarily that it transgressed “fundamental 
principles of criminal law, such as the principle of legality, to not 
link the status of victim and consequent rights of participation to 
the charges confirmed against the accused.”4  Judge Blattman 
found it “necessary to state, first and foremost, . . . that victims’ 
participation is not a concession of the Bench, but rather a right 
accorded to victims by the [Rome] Statute.”5 
¶5 This article posits that the framework for victims’ participa-
tion established in the first years of the ICC has proven to be un-
workable and is falling short, most importantly, in delivering 
meaningful participation to victims, the intended beneficiaries.  
The source of the failing, moreover, has been precisely the ten-
dency of the ICC’s judicial decisions to grant concessions rather 
than observe the compromises reached during the negotiation of 
the Rome Statute, when it was fully foreseen that the innovation of 
victim’s participation could, if poorly defined or administered, 
overwhelm the core mandate of prosecuting and trying perpetrators 
of atrocities.  The record of the ICC’s early years demonstrates that 
thousands of pages and thousands of hours (likely representing a 
substantial number of euro), have been expended in delivering ac-
tual participation in proceedings on behalf of very few victims.  
                                                 
2 See First Darfur Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 8; First DRC Grant of Ap-
peal, supra note 1, at 8. 
3 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, 
Decision on Victims’ Participation, Public, ¶¶ 93-95 (Trial Chamber I, Jan. 18, 
2008) [hereinafter Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation]. 
4 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, 
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge René Blattman to Decision on Vic-
tim’s Participation, Public, ¶ 21 (Appeals Chamber, Jan. 18, 2008) [hereinafter 
J. Blattman Dissent to Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation].   
5 See id. ¶ 13. 
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The call for new ideas or shifts in direction, including to the Ap-
peals Chamber, is timely. 
¶6 Although it was never expected that meaningful victims’ 
participation would be incorporated into complex international 
criminal trials without difficulty, it would be unfortunate for the 
ICC to fail to adapt in response to experience gained.  After de-
scribing the ICC’s performance in providing meaningful victims’ 
participation to date, and exploring the sources for the shortcom-
ings in that performance, this article attempts to answer the ques-
tion of how the ICC might alter its manner of “dealing with” appli-
cations to participate as victims in ICC proceedings.  Finally, it is 
logical that ICC prosecutions will remain extremely narrow in 
scope, in relation to the underlying conflicts, criminality and vic-
timization, and therefore that victims may continue to find partici-
pation in ICC proceedings a blunt instrument for fully vindicating 
their interests.  The article accordingly suggests ways that victims 
and victim representatives might: (1) obtain more meaningful and 
extensive participation in ICC proceedings; and (2) better capital-
ize on the existence of ICC investigations and cases to disseminate 
views and concerns, inside and outside the Court, in the cause of 
bringing accountability and vindicating victims’ interests. 
II. ICC JURISPRUDENCE ON VICTIMS’ PARTICIPATION 
¶7 At the time of the writing of this article, the true nature of the 
right being provided to individuals seeking to participate in ICC 
proceedings is the entitlement to stand in a queue, for longer than a 
year, to obtain a theoretical participation privilege which most 
likely will never be converted to an actual right to express views 
and concerns in court proceedings.  The War Crimes Research Of-
fice of American University Washington College of Law 
(“WCRO”), in the first comprehensive review of the operation of 
the ICC victim participation framework, described in late 2007 that 
the ICC system has “consumed a substantial portion of the Court’s 
resources since January 2006,” while delivering “largely hypo-
thetical” participation to a “limited number of victims,” making it 
“questionable whether the Pre-Trial Chambers have struck a rea-
sonably effective balance between the restorative goals of the ICC 
victim participation scheme and the [Rome Statute] drafters’ con-
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cerns about efficiency and fairness.”6  Victims’ representatives are 
currently among those expressing doubt and concern about the 
workability of the ICC victim participation scheme.7  To under-
stand how this state of affairs came about, it is necessary to explore 
the development of the law regarding victims’ participation at the 
ICC.  It is also helpful to trace the evolution of the parties’ objec-
tions to the emerging framework. 
A. The Negotiations Creating the ICC and the Balance Struck in 
the Rome Statute 
¶8 The issue of victims’ participation was prominent during the 
negotiations at which the Rome Statute took shape.  Non-
governmental organizations, including groups advocating the 
rights of victims, were indeed a powerful force in ensuring that the 
ICC became a reality.8  Negotiators agreed upon the major innova-
tion of conferring upon victims, for the first time in any interna-
tionalized criminal court, rights to participate in proceedings and to 
obtain reparations.9  The granting of a right to participate in pro-
ceedings, independent of the right to obtain recompense, recog-
                                                 
6 WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, AM. UNIV. WASHINGTON COLL. OF LAW, 
VICTIM PARTICIPATION BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 5 (2007) 
[hereinafter WCRO Report]. 
7 See, e.g., Sudan Victim Lawyers recount their experiences with the ICC so far, 
ACCESS: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, (Vic-
tims’ Rights Working Group, London, Eng.), Issue No. 9, Summer/Autumn 
2007, at 1, 7 [hereinafter VRWG Article re Darfur Applicants]; Katy Glass-
borow, Victim Participation in ICC Cases Jeopardised, AFRICA REPORT NO. 148 
(Institute of War and Peace Reporting, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 20, 2007 [here-
inafter IWPR Report]. 
8 See Marlies Glasius, How Activists Shaped the Court, THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: AN END TO IMPUNITY? (Crimes of War Project), Dec. 2003, 
available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/icc_magazine/icc-glasius.html (de-
scribing importance of non-governmental organizations in negotiations at Rome, 
including efforts by NGO coalitions formed to advocate on behalf of victims). 
9 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 
July 17, 1998, art. 68(3), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]; Claude Jorda and Jérôme de Hemptinne, The Status 
and Role of the Victim, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, 1387, 1388 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 
2002) [hereinafter Jorda and de Hemptinne](stating that the Rome Statute “ap-
pears to mark a new step forward . . . victims are accorded the double status de-
nied to them by the provisions setting up the ad hoc Tribunals.  First they are 
able to take part in the criminal process . . . .  Secondly, they are entitled to seek 
form the Court reparations . . . .”). 
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nized that victims had a unique “voice” to raise in proceedings, and 
that any justice obtained in the ICC should have the nature of re-
storing dignity to victims in addition to seeking retribution.10  Vic-
tims therefore obtained, in the text of the Rome Statute, the right to 
“express views and concerns,” through a legal representative, at 
proceedings at which their personal interests are affected.11 
¶9 The consensus in favor of granting victims, quite literally, a 
“place at the table” in ICC proceedings, predictably was tempered 
by a view—equally widely considered and shared—that victims’ 
participation should not occur to a degree or in a manner that 
would undermine the core ICC mission of trying perpetrators of 
mass crimes.  As one participant in the negotiations put it, “[i]t was 
considered absolutely necessary to devise a realistic system that 
would give satisfaction to those who had suffered harm without 
jeopardizing the ability of the Court to proceed against those who 
had committed the crimes.”12  The concern to protect the Court’s 
ability to function effectively in adjudicating cases recognized that 
victims share with other affected parties the strong interest that the 
ICC succeed in prosecuting cases and reaching judgments.13  
Drafters of the Rome Statute also logically had apprehensions that 
greater victims’ participation would undermine the rights of the 
defense 14 or upset the balance of roles between the prosecution and 
the defense.15 
                                                 
10 See WCRO Report, supra note 6, at 8-11, 16-18, and sources cited therein.  
11 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 68(3) (stating in pertinent part, “Such views 
and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives of the victims where 
the Court considers it appropriate, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence”). 
12 See Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, Definition of Victims and General 
Principle, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND 
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 427, 429 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Fernández de Gurmendi]. 
13 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COMMENTARY TO THE SECOND 
PREPARATORY COMMISSION MEETING ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, § 2 (1999) (“The interests of justice and the interests of victims are 
complementary. The overriding interest of victims is likely to be the interest in 
seeing that crimes are effectively investigated and that justice is done.”). 
14 See, e.g., Gilbert Bitti & Håkan Friman, Participation of Victims in the Pro-
ceedings, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:  ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND 
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 456, 457 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Bitti and Friman] (“some delegations were also uncertain what impact such 
an individual role would have on the rights of the accused”). 
15 See, e.g., Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 9, at 1399 (“It is not a simple 
matter, however, to allow a third protagonist to play an active role in the adver-
sarial proceedings.  Since such proceedings are based on an already delicate 
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¶10 The right of participation granted in the Rome Statute 
therefore was both unprecedented yet consciously bounded.  Vic-
tims obtained the status of “participants,” but not “parties.”16  The 
RPE specified that at trials, for example, victims could be re-
stricted to written submissions made by their legal representatives 
and would be permitted to question witnesses or experts or defen-
dants, again through their representatives, only after submitting 
proposals to the Chamber and obtaining Chamber approval.17  Vic-
tims were curbed from obtaining forms of participation that they 
enjoyed as parties civiles in certain civil law systems.18  For exam-
ple, they could not initiate prosecutions or compel the bringing of 
criminal cases, nor could they routinely obtain the evidence of the 
Prosecution or defense or call witnesses.19 
¶11 As happened with many of the thorny issues discussed 
during negotiations at Rome, the task of more precisely defining 
the right of victims’ participation, and balancing that right with 
objectives of fairness and efficiency, was deferred for the consid-
eration of the judges who would later be appointed.  Article 68(3) 
of the Rome Statute, the sub-section granting the right of victims’ 
participation, provides, in pertinent part: 
                                                                                                             
equilibrium between two parties, there is a real danger that, unless the rights of 
victims are accompanied by the conferment on the judge of effective powers of 
control, the rights of the accused may be prejudiced and the trials considerably 
delayed.”). 
16 In the terminology of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the 
Prosecution and Defense are referred to as “parties” and participating victims as 
“participants.” 
17 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, ICC-
ASP/1/3(2002), R. 91(2) & (3) [hereinafter RPE]. 
18 In some civil law systems, a victim may act as a partie civile, a claimant au-
thorized to pursue civil damages as part of the criminal case.  See, e.g., Marion 
E. I. Brienen & Ernestine H. Hoegen, Victims of Crime, 22 EUR. CRIM. JUST. 
SYS. 27 (2000).  The authority of victims in certain civil law jurisdictions can 
extend to requesting investigative steps, initiating cases against alleged perpetra-
tors, questioning witnesses, and presenting evidence.  See id. at 27-29.      
19  See Bitti and Friman, supra note 14, at 457 n.67  (“Contrary to what is the 
case in, for example, French and Swedish municipal systems, victims do not 
have the right under the Rome Statute to initiate the criminal proceedings.”); 
Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 9, at 1406 (“a victim does not enjoy the 
same rights as the other parties to the proceedings.  He may not participate in the 
investigation undertaken by the Prosecutor, have access to the evidence gathered 
by the parties, nor call witnesses to testify at the hearing.  Furthermore, he has 
no right of appeal . . . .).   
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Where the personal interests of the victims are af-
fected, the Court shall permit their views and con-
cerns to be presented and considered at stages of the 
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the 
Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair 
and impartial trial.20 
¶12 The governing documents of the ICC—the Rome Statute and 
the RPE—offer concrete directives about victims’ participation at 
certain proceedings, such as proceedings relating to jurisdiction 
and admissibility questions,21 confirmation hearings,22 and trials.23  
The text of Art. 68(3), however, ensures that the ICC judges will 
determine the scope of victims’ participation, because it leaves 
“personal interests” undefined and calls upon the judiciary to de-
cide the appropriateness of participation at different stages of the 
proceeding. 
B. The January 17, 2006 Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I in the 
DRC Situation 
¶13 Against this backdrop, the decision taken on January 17, 
2006 by Pre-Trial Chamber I, to grant victims a general right to 
participate in proceedings during the investigation of a “situa-
tion,”24 was accurately seen to be a watershed decision of the 
fledgling Court.  The first interpretation of Article 68(3) came in 
                                                 
20 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 68(3). 
21 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 19(3) (“In proceedings with respect to 
jurisdiction or admissibility, those who have referred the situation under article 
13, as well as victims, may also submit observations to the Court.”); RPE, supra 
note 17, R. 59(1)(b) (directing the Registrar to inform victims who have com-
municated with the Court, when there is any question or challenge of jurisdic-
tion or admissibility).  
22 See RPE, supra note 17, R. 92(3) (“In order to allow victims to apply for par-
ticipation . . . the Court shall notify victims regarding its decision to hold a hear-
ing to confirm charges . . . .”). 
23 See RPE, supra note 17, R. 91(2) and 91(3)(a) & (b) (providing that legal rep-
resentatives of victims who attend and participate at trial may be limited to writ-
ten observations or submissions and may seek authorization to question wit-
nesses and the accused). 
24 In the terminology of the Rome Statute, the subject matter of an investigation 
is a “situation,” see, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 13, and thus the two 
terms are synonymous. 
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the context of the DRC investigation, before the commencement of 
any ICC case or the naming of any defendant. 
¶14 Pre-Trial Chamber I, led at the time by the Honorable Claude 
Jorda, expanded the victim’s participation right: (1) beyond any 
definition foreseen or advocated by any commentator on the Rome 
Statute;25 and (2) by the Chamber’s own description, beyond any 
right required by the Statute’s text.  The ruling of Pre-Trial Cham-
ber I was that participation by victims in the investigation was war-
ranted because “victims are affected in general at the investigation 
stage, since the participation of victims at this stage can serve to 
clarify the facts, to punish the perpetrators of crimes and to request 
reparations for the harm suffered.”26  The Chamber carefully dis-
claimed that Article 68(3) required that victims be permitted to 
participate during the investigation; it found instead that the provi-
sion “does not necessarily exclude the stage of investigation of a 
situation.”27  The Chamber found that the textual ellipsis was best 
treated by granting a general right of victims to participate in the 
investigation, because this broader participation was “consistent 
with the object and purpose of the victims participation regime es-
tablished by the drafters of the Statue [sic] . . . .”28  In particular, 
the Chamber noted that the ICC had been created as a result of “a 
debate that took place in the context of a growing emphasis placed 
on the role of victims by the international body of human rights 
law and by international humanitarian law.”29  The Chamber found 
persuasive a trend it saw in cases from the European Court of Hu-
man Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to 
grant victims the right to participate in proceedings during the in-
vestigation stage, “to have the facts clarified and the perpetrators 
prosecuted,” particularly when “the outcome of criminal proceed-
                                                 
25 Claude Jorda himself had commented, before being appointed a judge of the 
ICC, that victims “may not participate in the investigation undertaken by the 
Prosecutor. . . .” Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 9, at 1406. 
26 Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, 
VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, Public Redacted Version, ¶ 63 (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter 17 January 2006 DRC Decision] (empha-
sis added).  
27 Id. ¶ 38. 
28 Id. ¶ 50. 
29 Id. 
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ings is of decisive importance for obtaining reparations for the 
harm suffered.”30 
¶15 The decision anticipated victims’ participation in a variety of 
investigation-phase proceedings.  The decision ruled that victims 
might “be heard by the Chamber in order to present their views and 
concerns and to file documents pertaining to the current investiga-
tion of the situation in the DRC.”31  The decision opined that vic-
tims could potentially participate in proceedings relating to the 
protection of victims and witnesses and the preservation of evi-
dence, and in other proceedings initiated by the Prosecution or de-
fense.32  Pre-Trial Chamber I granted to victims vis-à-vis the inves-
tigation or situation the right to seek “specific measures,” without 
further defining what those measures might be.33 
¶16 Pre-Trial Chamber I interpreted in a narrow fashion its 
obligation under Article 68(3) to disallow victims’ participation 
that is prejudicial to the rights of the accused or to a fair and impar-
tial trial.  The Pre-Trial Chamber disclaimed any need to consider 
whether the general right to participate in the investigation phase 
itself implicated or impaired fairness, efficiency, or the rights of 
the defense.34  This was because, in the Chamber’s view, victims’ 
participation during the investigation phase “does not per se jeop-
ardise the appearance of integrity and objectivity of the investiga-
tion, nor is it inherently inconsistent with basic considerations of 
efficiency and security.”35 The Chamber determined that any 
prejudice to the defense or to fairness or efficiency could instead 
be regulated by determining, on a case-by-case basis, the appropri-
ate “modalities,” or methods of participation, when victims sought 
to intervene in particular investigation-stage proceedings.36 
¶17 The result of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s ruling was to grant to six 
applicants what it termed “the status of victim,” or the general right 
to participate during the DRC investigation phase, in the absence 
of any request to participate in any particular investigation-phase 
proceeding, and before any case in the DRC investigation had 
                                                 
30 See id. ¶¶ 50-53, 63. 
31 Id. ¶ 71. 
32 See id. ¶¶ 73-74. 
33 See id. at 42. 
34 See id. ¶ 57. 
35 Id.  
36 See id. ¶¶ 57, 70. 
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commenced.37  Given the circumstance that the DRC investigation 
extended to all crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction which might 
have been committed within the territory of the DRC since July 1, 
2002, the Chamber granted the right to participate based on reason-
ing that the six applicants established “grounds to believe” that 
they had suffered harm resulting from some crime within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction (i.e., genocide, war crimes, or crimes against human-
ity) and committed somewhere in the DRC since July 1, 2002.38  
The Chamber reasoned that the burden of proof of “grounds to be-
lieve” was appropriate because that same low standard triggered 
another right during the investigation phase.39  Specifically, a wit-
ness’ entitlement to be warned about the right against self-
incrimination, and to counsel, under Article 55(2), applies when 
the Prosecutor finds “grounds to believe” that the witness has 
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.40 
¶18 After the first case of the DRC investigation commenced, 
with the arrest of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo in March 2006, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I invited views on whether the same six applicants should 
be granted the right to participate in the Lubanga case.41  The 
Chamber ruled, after hearing from the parties and the applicants’ 
representative, that to qualify to participate in the case, the appli-
cants would have to meet the much more stringent standard of 
demonstrating “that a sufficient causal link exists between the 
harm they suffered and the crimes . . . for which the Chamber has 
issued an arrest warrant.”42  The six applicants failed to qualify to 
participate in the case, and thus it became clear that they were not 
victims of the specific crimes with which Lubanga was charged: 
child conscription, child enlistment or use of children in hostilities. 
¶19 By the time Lubanga’s confirmation hearing was held, in 
November 2006, four other victims of the DRC conflict had ob-
tained the “status of victim” in the Lubanga case.43  These appli-
                                                 
37 See id. at 41. 
38 See id. ¶¶ 94, 98, 102-86. 
39 See id. ¶ 98. 
40 See id.  
41 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-172-
tEN, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings Submit-
ted by VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 in the Case the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Public Redacted Version, 2-3 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, June 29, 2006) [hereinafter 
DRC Decision on Case Participation of VPRS 1 to VPRS 6]. 
42 See id. at 6. 
43 Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-177-tENG, Decision on the 
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cants qualified for participation in the case because they estab-
lished that their sons had been conscripted or enlisted by 
Lubanga’s armed group, the Union des Patriotes Congolaises 
(“UPC”) during late 2002 or early 2003, the time periods at issue 
in Lubanga’s arrest warrant.44  The four victims, whose applica-
tions had been culled from over seventy applications to participate 
in the case considered by Pre-Trial Chamber I,45 expressed views 
and concerns through representatives in Lubanga’s confirmation 
hearing, held in late 2006.46 
                                                                                                             
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and 
a/0003/06 in the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and of the 
investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Public, 10, 12, 13, 16 
(Pre-Trial Chamber I,  July 31, 2006) [hereinafter 31 July 2006 Lubanga Case 
Decision] (admitting three applicants to participate in Lubanga case and DRC 
situation); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
601-tEN, Decision on Applications for Participation in Proceedings a/0004/06 to 
a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06, a/0071/06 to a/0080/06, and a/0105/06 in the 
case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Public, 12-13 (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter 20 October 2006 Lubanga Case Deci-
sion] (admitting one applicant to participate in Lubanga case). 
44 See 31 July 2006 Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at  8-13, 16; 20 Oc-
tober 2006 Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 11-12, 13.  The applicants 
were held to the standard of establishing “reasonable grounds to believe” vic-
timization resulted from a crime charged in the arrest warrant.  See 31 July 2006 
Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 9; 20 October 2006 Lubanga Case 
Decision, supra note 43, at 12.  This standard for participation in case proceed-
ings had been adopted in the DRC Decision on Case Participation of VPRS 1 to 
VPRS 6, supra note 41, at 6, presumably based on reasoning that the applicants 
should meet the same burden the Prosecutor had satisfied obtaining the arrest 
warrant that had commenced the case.  See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 
58(1)(a) (providing that warrant issuance will be conditioned upon finding of 
“reasonable grounds to believe” that the person whose arrest or appearance is 
sought has committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court).  
45 See DRC Decision on Case Participation of VPRS 1 to VPRS 6, supra note 
41, at 8-9 (denying participation to six applicants); 31 July 2006 Lubanga Case 
Decision, supra note 43, at 16 (granting participation to three applicants); 20 
October 2006 Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 13 (granting participa-
tion to one of sixty-five applications considered).   
46 See 20 October 2006 Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 13; Prosecutor 
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, Decision on the Confir-
mation of Charges, Public Redacted Version with Annex I, ¶¶ 30-31 (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Jan. 29, 2007) (specifying dates of hearing and submissions of vic-
tims’ representatives).   
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C. The Subsequent Decisions of the Pre-Trial Chambers in the 
Northern Uganda and Darfur Situations 
¶20 In subsequent decisions, judges of the Pre-Trial Chambers 
sitting in the investigations in northern Uganda and in Darfur 
joined the view that it was appropriate to grant a general right to 
participate in investigations.  These decisions stated more explic-
itly that the participation right remained hypothetical, pending a 
separate determination of the propriety of participation in a spe-
cific proceeding.  The Chambers also defined victim participation 
standards differently than the January 17, 2006 decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I. 
¶21 The decision in the Uganda situation was issued on August 
10, 2007, more than a year and a half after Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 
decision.47  By that time, five arrest warrants in the case Prosecutor 
v. Joseph Kony had been made public, in October 2005,48 but no 
defendant had been arrested. 
¶22 The Single Judge assigned by Pre-Trial Chamber II to 
manage victims’ issues49 in the Uganda situation affirmed the 
“broad approach” of granting a general right of victims to partici-
pate in the investigation phase.50  The August 10, 2007 decision 
was made in the context of deciding forty-nine applications, sub-
mitted from June to November 2006, by individuals seeking to par-
ticipate in the Uganda investigation and the Kony case.51  Like Pre-
Trial Chamber I, the Single Judge determined that participation at 
the investigation stage was not required by the Rome Statute, but 
instead “was not excluded from” the scope of Article 68(3)52 and 
remained “consistent with” the object and purpose of the Rome 
                                                 
47 Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-101, Decision on Victims’ Ap-
plications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to 
1/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Public Redacted Version (Pre-Trial 
Chamber II,  Aug. 10, 2007) [hereinafter 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision]. 
48 ICC Press Release, Warrants of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA Com-
manders, ICC-20051014-110-EN (Oct. 14, 2005) available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=114&l=ehtml [hereinafter ICC Press Release re 
Uganda Warrants]. 
49 See 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47. A judge acts as Single 
Judge pursuant to appointment of the Chamber, see id. at 2, and thus his or her 
decision is equal to that of the Chamber itself.  The 10 August 2007 Uganda 
Decision was rendered by Judge Mauro Politi. 
50 See id. ¶ 83.     
51 See id. at 2-3 & ¶ 2.  
52 Id. ¶ 7. 
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Statute.53  While agreeing on the existence of the general right, 
however, the Single Judge believed it “critical to ensuring the pre-
dictability of proceedings and ultimately the certainty and effec-
tiveness of victims’ participation” to “specify[] the nature and 
scope of the proceedings in which victims may participate in the 
context of a situation, prior to, and/or irrespective of, a case . . . .”54  
The decision thus undertook to provide a non-exhaustive list of 
proceedings in which victims might expect to participate. 55  Some 
of the proceedings on the list, however, were ones in which victims 
could have expected to participate in any event, because the Rome 
Statute specifies them as proceedings in which victims’ views must 
be sought.56  The Single Judge proposed new possibilities of victim 
participation, for example, in proceedings relating to protective 
measures for victims or the preservation of evidence, even “when 
it would still be unknown whether the evidence to be preserved 
refers to an incident which will be the subject of a warrant of arrest 
or summons to appear.”57 
¶23 The decision in the northern Uganda situation committed the 
Chambers to undertake two separate case-by-case inquiries in rela-
tion to any application to participate in the investigation: first, to 
determine whether the “status of victim” could be granted vis-à-vis 
an investigation, and second, to determine whether that “victim” 
may participate in any given investigation-phase proceeding with-
out impairing fairness or efficiency.58  This aspect of the Single 
Judge’s decision was consistent with the January 17, 2006 decision 
of Pre-Trial Chamber I, which had also deferred fairness and effi-
ciency considerations.  The Single Judge’s decision, however, 
added a requirement to the second step of the inquiry by holding 
that even an applicant granted the theoretical right to participate in 
                                                 
53 Id. ¶ 7 (quoting 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 50). 
54 Id. ¶ 88. 
55 See id. 
56 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 90-95 (discussing right of victims under Arts. 15, 19, and Rule 
92(2) to be heard when Prosecutor commences investigation proprio motu, 
when questions relating to jurisdiction or admissibility are raised, or when the 
Prosecutor determines not to investigate or prosecute based on interests of jus-
tice concerns under Art. 53).  
57 See id. ¶¶ 96-101.  
58 See id. ¶ 83 (stating that the “only requirement” for granting the status of vic-
tim “would be that applicant victims claim to have suffered harm as a conse-
quence of events allegedly qualifying as crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court that, while encompassed in the scope of the situation, are not, or are yet to 
be, the subject matter of a case.”). 
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investigation-phase proceedings, based on the general interests of 
victims in investigations, would additionally “need to indicate how 
[his or her] ‘personal interests’ could be affected in relation to pro-
ceedings in which [he or she] may participate, despite the fact that 
no case . . . is (as yet) under judicial scrutiny.”59  The Single Judge 
thus found that whether the Chamber would grant victim participa-
tion in a specific investigation-stage proceeding would depend, 
“not only upon the nature and scope of the proceeding, but also 
upon the personal circumstances of the victim in question,” as well 
as potential effects on fairness and efficiency.60 
¶24 This legal rule, which was not further explained, appeared to 
echo, without citing, a prior ruling of the Appeals Chamber in the 
Lubanga case.  In a decision dated June 13, 2007, the Appeals 
Chamber had decided that the four victims participating in the 
Lubanga case would not be permitted to submit views and con-
cerns on the question of whether the Appeals Chamber would grant 
the defense an appeal from the Pre-Trial Chamber decision con-
firming the charges against Lubanga.61  The Appeals Chamber had 
found that the victims had failed to demonstrate an effect on their 
personal interests, despite their claims: (1) that the appeal affected 
whether the case would proceed against Lubanga; and (2) that their 
participation in the confirmation hearing itself rendered it impossi-
ble that they could not participate in an appeal arising from that 
hearing.62  The Appeals Chamber held that “whether the personal 
interests of victims are affected in relation to a particular appeal 
will require careful consideration on a case-by-case basis.”63  The 
Appeals Chamber also had noted that victims would be held to 
demonstrate, in particular, that the interests they assert do not “be-
long instead to the role assigned to the Prosecutor.”64 
¶25 The Single Judge in the Uganda situation approached the 
applicant’s burden of proof in the same manner as Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, but did not agree on the terminology of “grounds to 
                                                 
59 Id. ¶ 89. 
60 See id. ¶¶ 89, 103. 
61 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-925, Deci-
sion of the Appeals Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to 
a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the “Directions and Decision of the Ap-
peals Chamber” of 2 February 2007, Public, ¶ 29 (June 13, 2007). 
62 See id. ¶¶ 10-11. 
63 Id. ¶ 28. 
64 Id. 
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believe.”65  Rather, the Single Judge characterized the test as one 
requiring “intrinsic coherence” of the applicant’s claim to have 
suffered from a crime within the scope of the ICC investigation.66  
The Single Judge also took up a matter not addressed in detail in 
the Pre-Trial Chamber I decision: the forms of identification suffi-
cient to prove an applicant’s identity.  The Single Judge deter-
mined that applicants could not qualify for participation, “in prin-
ciple,” without first submitting proof of identity issued by a “rec-
ognized public authority.”67  Using this rule, the Single Judge de-
ferred decisions on applications supported by less formal forms of 
proof of identity.68 
¶26 The Single Judge found, upon applying the legal standards 
announced in his decision, that only two of the forty-nine appli-
cants had properly established a claim to have suffered harm as a 
result of crimes committed since July 1, 2002 in northern Uganda, 
and thus should be granted the “status of victim” vis-a-vis the in-
vestigation.69  The Single Judge also determined that six of the 
forty-nine applicants should be granted the “status of victim” in the 
Kony case.70  In making determinations about eligibility to partici-
pate in the case, the Single Judge applied the same test as had Pre-
Trial Chamber I.  Thus, the six successful applicants had demon-
strated that they had suffered from one of the crimes charged in the 
warrants of arrest in the case.71  In the Kony case, five leaders of 
the Lord’s Resistance Army, an armed rebel group, had been 
charged in thirty-three counts for their role in six of the hundreds 
                                                 
65 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, ¶ 15.  
66 See id. The Single Judge imposed the additional requirement that applicants to 
participate in the situation must establish “to a high degree of probability the 
occurrence of incidents related by the applicants, both in temporal and territorial 
terms.” Id. ¶ 106. The requirement could be satisfied, in the Single Judge’s view, 
by the submission of information from the applicant or the Registry that the in-
cidents during which the applicants claimed to have suffered harm in fact oc-
curred.  See id.  
67 See id. ¶ 16.  
68 See id. ¶¶ 109-11. The decision of the Single Judge directed the Victims’ Par-
ticipation and Reparations Section (“VPRS”) to inform the applicants whose 
petitions had been deferred of the deficiencies in their applications. See id. at 61. 
69 See id. at 61. One of the case victims was also admitted as a situation victim. 
See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. ¶¶ 9, 10 (describing necessity that victim have been involved in crime 
charged) & 30, 39, 49, 59, 66, 75 (granting participation in case to applicants 
who related having been victimized as a result of “incidents . . . included in the 
warrants of arrest issued in the Case”).  
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of attacks allegedly carried out in northern Uganda after July 1, 
2002.72 
¶27 The Single Judge deferred consideration of the vast majority 
of the applications—forty-two in total—pending submission of 
additional information by the applicants and/or the Registry.73  In 
March 2008, seven months after his first decision, the Single Judge 
revisited the deferred applications, following the submission of 
further information by the Registry.74  The result of this evaluation 
was the adjudication of another fifteen of the original forty-nine 
applications, based on the Single Judge’s decision to “lower” the 
requirements for forms of identification which would be deemed 
reliable, in light of “the factual circumstances in the region” such 
as widespread reliance on non-official forms of identification.75 
¶28 The Pre-Trial Chamber assigned to the Darfur situation 
issued on December 3, 2007 its first decision regarding standards it 
would apply in deciding applications to participate.76  The Cham-
ber was Pre-Trial Chamber I, but of a different membership be-
cause of the intervening retirement of Judge Jorda.77  In the Darfur 
                                                 
72 ICC Press Release re Uganda Warrants, supra note 48.  
73 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, at 62. 
74 Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-125, Decision on Victims’ Ap-
plication for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06, 
a/0082/06, a/0084/06 to a/0089/06, a/0091/06 to a/0097/06, a/0099/06, 
a/0100/06, a/0102/06 to a/0104/06, a/0111/06, a/0113/06 to a/0117/06, 
a/0120/06, a/0121/06 and a/0123/06 to a/0127/06, Public Redacted Version 
(Pre-Trial Chamber II, Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Second Decision re Uganda 
Participation]. 
75 See id. at 70-71 & ¶¶ 4, 6. The Second Decision re Uganda Participation has 
been appealed by ad hoc defense counsel. See Situation in Uganda, Situation 
No. ICC-02/04-128-tENG, Defence Application for Leave to Appeal the Deci-
sion on Victims’ Applications for Participation Issued on 14 March 2008, Public 
(Pre-Trial Chamber II, Mar. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Defense Request for Leave to 
Appeal Second Decision re Uganda Participation] (challenging existence of 
general right to participate in the investigation).  The OTP has stated that it does 
not oppose the application. See Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-
128, Prosecution’s Response to Defence’s Request for Leave to Appeal the Sin-
gle Judge’s 14 March 2008 Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings, Public, ¶ 10 (Mar. 31, 2008).   
76 See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-110, Decision on the 
Requests of the OPCD on the Production of Relevant Supporting Documenta-
tion Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the Regulations of the Court and on the 
Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the Prosecutor, Public (Pre-Trial Cham-
ber I, Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter 3 December 2007 Darfur Decision on OPCD 
Requests for Addt’l and Exculpatory Information]. 
77 The Chamber was then composed of Judge Akua Kuenyehia, Judge Anita 
Ušacka, and Judge Sylvia Steiner.  See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. 
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situation, the case Prosecutor v. Ahmad Harun had commenced, 
but again, no defendants were in custody, and therefore the Office 
of Public Counsel for the Defense (“OPCD”), a unit of the Regis-
try, had been authorized to file observations regarding victims’ ap-
plications on behalf of future defendants.78  In relation to some of 
the first applications to participate in the Darfur situation and case, 
the OPCD filed requests that the applicants and the Office of the 
Prosecutor (“OTP”) be required to provide information that might 
tend to undermine the credibility of the allegations of the appli-
cants.79  The Single Judge charged with managing victim-related 
matters denied these requests in the December 3, 2007 decision 
and, in the course of doing so, affirmed that “there is a procedural 
status of victim in relation to situation and case proceedings before 
the Pre-Trial Chamber.”80  The Single Judge affirmed, without ex-
tended discussion, that she would follow the ruling of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I in deeming the stage of investigation of a situation to be 
an appropriate stage for victim participation.81 
¶29 Three days later, the Single Judge issued a decision in which 
she granted “the procedural status of victim,” vis-à-vis the investi-
gation, to eleven applicants.82  A total of twenty-one applications 
                                                                                                             
ICC-02/05-83, Decision Replacing a Judge in Pre-Trial Chamber I, Public 
(Presidency, June 22, 2007). 
78 See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-74, Decision Author-
ising the Filing of Observations on Applications for Participation in the Proceed-
ings a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, Public, 3 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, May 23, 2007). 
79 See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-95, Public Redacted 
Version of Request for the Single Judge to Order the Production of Relevant 
Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Rule 86(2)(e), Public (Aug. 21, 2007) 
[hereinafter OPCD Darfur Request for Addt’l Information from Applicants]; 
Situation in the Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-97, Request for the 
Single Judge to Order the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Materials, Public 
(Aug. 24, 2007) [hereinafter OPCD Darfur Request for Exculpatory Materials]. 
80 See 3 December 2007 Darfur Decision on OPCD Requests for Addt’l and 
Exculpatory Information, supra note 76, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).  The Single 
Judge was Judge Akua Kuenyehia. 
81 See id.  The OPCD later argued that the lack of reasoning was itself a ground 
of appeal, and that the Single Judge appeared wrongly to have believed that the 
17 January 2006 DRC Decision was binding in the Darfur situation.  See Situa-
tion in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-113, Request for Leave to Ap-
peal the “Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of 
Applicants a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to a/0033/07 and 
a/0035/07 to a/0038/07,” Public, ¶ 15 & n.9 (Dec. 12, 2007). 
82 See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-111-Corr, Corrigen-
dum to Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of Ap-
plicants a/0011/06 to 1/015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to a/0033/07 and 
a/0035/07 to a/0038/07, Public, 3-5, 22-23 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Dec. 14, 2007) 
2008]                                                   CHRISTINE H. CHUNG                                                                  
        
477
had been submitted to the Court between June 2006 and July 2007, 
and each applicant had sought to participate in the situation and 
case.83  The Single Judge deferred consideration of the applicants’ 
requests to participate in the case.84  The eleven applicants that ob-
tained the “status of victim” vis-à-vis the investigation were 
deemed to have established “grounds to believe” that they suffered 
harm from crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and commit-
ted in Darfur.85  The Single Judge denied ten applicants the right to 
participate in the investigation, on grounds, for example, that two 
applicants were deceased, and that other applicants had not pre-
sented adequate proof of relation to the victims on whose behalf 
they claimed to act.86  Two of the ten applicants denied the right to 
participate were invited to submit missing or supplementary infor-
mation.87  The Single Judge gave notice of the proofs of identity 
that would be deemed acceptable in the Darfur situation.88 
¶30 The Single Judge’s decision in the Darfur situation adopted 
the framework of the “two-stage qualification system” envisioned 
by the Pre-Trial Chamber in its January 17, 2006 decision in the 
DRC situation.  Thus, she emphasized that even applicants granted 
the procedural “status of victim” would need to demonstrate, in 
relation to any future proceeding in which they might seek to par-
ticipate, that participation could occur “in a manner which is not 
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused.”89  The 
Single Judge, however, rejected the views of the Appeals Chamber 
and the Single Judge in the Uganda situation that effect on “per-
sonal interests” of victims must be re-assessed in the context of the 
particular proceeding in which a victim sought to participate.  In-
stead, the December 6, 2007 decision stated that “the assessment of 
                                                                                                             
[hereinafter 6 December 2007 Darfur Decision]. The decision was re-issued by 
means of the Corrigendum, dated 14 December 2007, which does not acknowl-
edge that the original decision was issued on December 6, 2007.  
83 See id. at 3-5 & ¶ 8. 
84 See id. ¶ 8 (“The Single Judge also notes that although all of the Applicants 
have requested to participate in all stages of proceedings, she will, at this stage, 
only examine whether the Applicants fulfil [sic] the criteria to be granted the 
procedural status of victims at the investigation stage of the Situation in Darfur, 
Sudan . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
85 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 45-47.   
86 See id. at 23 & ¶¶ 33, 35, 36. 
87 See id. ¶¶ 31, 33 & at 23. 
88 See id. ¶ 28.  
89 See id. ¶ 14. 
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the personal interests of the victims . . . is only to be conducted for 
the determination of the specific set of procedural rights attached 
to the procedural status of victim.”90 
D. The January 18, 2008 Trial Chamber Decision Regarding 
Participation in the Lubanga Trial 
¶31 Just after each of the Pre-Trial Chambers in the DRC, 
northern Uganda and Darfur situations had completed furnishing 
their decisions, the first active Trial Chamber, sitting on the 
Lubanga case, issued a “Decision on Victims’ Participation,” dated 
January 18, 2008.91  The decision of Trial Chamber I knocked 
away one of the linchpins of the existing jurisprudence on victims’ 
participation, by rejecting sua sponte the prior rulings of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I in the DRC situation and of the Single Judge in the 
Uganda situation that the status of victim, insofar as a case was 
concerned, should only be granted to victims of the crimes charged 
in arrest warrants.92 
¶32 The majority opinion, joined by the Honorable Adrian 
Fulford and Honorable Elizabeth Odio Benito, stated the intention 
to “provide the parties and participants with general guidelines on 
all matters related to the participation of victims throughout the 
proceedings.”93  As of the date of the Trial Chamber decision, there 
were still only four victims to whom the Chamber had granted the 
right to participate in any proceeding in the Lubanga case, despite 
the pendency of scores of applications to participate in the case, 
some filed as early as the fall of 2006,94 and the approaching trial 
date of March 31, 2008.95  The majority opinion did not discuss, or 
                                                 
90 Id. ¶ 13. 
91 See Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3. 
92 Compare id. ¶¶ 93-95 with, e.g., DRC Decision on Case Participation of 
VPRS 1 to VPRS, supra note 41, at 6 (“at the case stage, the Applicants must 
demonstrate that a sufficient causal link exists between the harm they have suf-
fered and the crimes for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo bears criminal responsibility and for which the Chamber 
has issued an arrest warrant”); 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, 
¶¶ 9, 30, 39, 49, 59, 66, 75 (applying standard of requiring applicant to have 
suffered harm from crimes which “appear to be included in the warrants of ar-
rest issued in the Case”). 
93 See Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶ 84. 
94 See id. at 1 (referencing as participants Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and 
a/0105/06); discussion infra in Part III.A (relating to number of pending applica-
tions). 
95 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1019, 
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even cite, any of the prior decisions of the Pre-Trial Chambers in 
which those Chambers had ruled that the status of victim vis-à-vis 
a case would be limited to applicants who alleged harm resulting 
from the charges prosecuted in the Court.  The majority held that 
an applicant would be entitled to “potentially participate” in a 
case—i.e., obtain an entitlement analogous to the right the Pre-
Trial Chambers had called the “status of victim”—if he or she was 
“a victim of any crime falling within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.”96  This ruling lowered the standard for granting the “status 
of victim” vis-à-vis a case, at a minimum, to the standard which 
until then had been applied to grant the “status of victim” vis-à-vis 
a situation.97 
¶33 The majority reasoned that Rule 85(a) of the RPE, which 
defined the term “victims” for the purposes of the Statute and the 
RPE, provided that “victims” were “natural persons who have suf-
fered harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.”98  The majority opined that because there 
was no further requirement set forth in Rule 85(a) that the harm to 
the victim must have resulted from the crimes prosecuted in the 
ICC, no such limitation could lawfully be imposed.99  The majority 
also found support for its broad definition of “victim” in Principles 
8 and 9 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 
                                                                                                             
Decision Regarding the Timing and Manner of Disclosure and the Date of Trial, 
Public, ¶ 29 (Trial Chamber I, Nov. 9, 2007). 
96 See Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶ 95 (emphasis 
added). 
97 The standard may even be lower than that used by the Pre-Trial Chambers to 
grant the “status of victim” and “procedural status of victim” to applicants to 
participate in the investigation, because the majority opinion does not limit the 
potential participation to applicants who allege crimes within the same situation.  
See J. Blattman Dissent to Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 
4, ¶ 9 (“in the Majority opinion there seems to be a re-categorisation of victims 
who are related neither to the situation nor to the case”).  As is described infra in 
notes 102-05 and in the accompanying text, the second inquiry envisioned by 
the majority opinion is to determine if there is a “real evidential link” between 
the victim and the evidence the Court will be considering at trial.  It is not in-
conceivable that a victim of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and 
committed in Uganda, for example, could have evidence or information relating 
to the Lubanga trial.     
98 See Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶ 93. 
99 See id. 
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(“Basic Victims’ Principles”).100  Those Principles provided that 
victims were persons “who individually or collectively suffered 
harm . . . through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations 
of international human rights law, or serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law,” without regard to “whether the perpetra-
tor of the violation is identified, apprehended, prosecuted, or con-
victed . . . .”101 
¶34 While substantially removing boundaries from the “status of 
victim” in a case, the majority stated that actual participation at 
trial would be limited by imposing a requirement that an applicant 
demonstrate credible grounds to infer either: (1) a “real evidential 
link” between the evidence considered by the Chamber during 
Lubanga’s trial and himself or herself; and (2) that his or her per-
sonal interests would otherwise be affected because those interests 
“are in a real sense engaged” by “an issue arising” during the 
trial.102  In requiring applicants to demonstrate, in a second step, 
links between their proposed participation and the evidence and 
issues likely to arise at trial, the reasoning of the majority openly 
favored applicants who would also qualify as witnesses.  The ma-
jority indeed ruled that “the right to introduce evidence during tri-
als before the Court is not limited to the parties,”103 and gave as 
examples of victims who would be permitted to participate at trial 
those who were “involve[d] in or presen[t] at a particular incident 
which the Chamber is considering,” or who “suffered identifiable 
harm” from such an incident.104   The Chamber declared it “critical 
to emphasise and repeat that for victims to participate in this trial 
these interests must relate to the evidence and the issues the 
Chamber will be considering in its investigation of the charges 
brought against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo . . . .”105 
¶35 The Trial Chamber’s majority opinion triggered the separate 
and dissenting opinion of Judge Blattman referenced in the Intro-
duction above.  Judge Blattman noted that he harbored “grave con-
                                                 
100 See id. ¶¶ 35, 92. 
101 See id. ¶ 35 (quoting Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Rem-
edy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, Prin-
ciples 8 & 9 (Dec. 16, 2005)). 
102 See id. ¶ 95. 
103 Id. ¶ 108. 
104 Id. ¶ 96. 
105 See id. ¶ 97 (emphasis added). 
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cerns with some fundamental premises within the decision.”106  He 
questioned, in particular, the standard chosen by the majority for 
granting the “status of victim,”107 a standard he found to be without 
foundation “in any national legislation or jurisprudence.”108  Judge 
Blattman opined that the majority was mistaken in failing to read 
the text of Rule 85 within the context of the implicit but absolute 
limitation of the Court’s competency, or jurisdiction.109  In Judge 
Blattman’s view, “the Trial Chamber has the competency to de-
termine whether a person is a victim only when linked to the facts 
and circumstances found within the charges presented by the 
prosecution and confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, and must 
stay within this framework in its consideration of victims.”110  The 
majority opinion’s reliance on the Basic Victims’ Principles “con-
cerned” Judge Blattman, because “the particular provisions relied 
on in the Majority decision were specifically considered and re-
jected during the preparatory stages of the drafting of the Rome 
Statute.”111 
¶36 In Judge Blattman’s opinion, failing to observe the parame-
ters established by the confirmed charges compromised the rights 
of the Accused, the fairness of the process, and equally the rights 
of victims.  An “over inclusive and imprecise” definition of vic-
tims, according to the dissenting opinion, made it “very difficult to 
know who is actually a victim of the alleged crimes attributed to 
the Accused,”112 a circumstance which in turn impaired the defen-
dant’s due process rights in a way which “upset” the “important 
balance” between the rights of victims to participate and “the abso-
lute right of the Accused to a fair and impartial trial.”113  Judge 
Blattman elaborated that neglecting to limit properly “the accusa-
tions that may be brought and . . . the actors that may intervene in 
the proceedings . . . would bring about . . . the inappropriate sce-
                                                 
106 See J. Blattman Dissent to Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra 
note 4, ¶ 32. 
107 Id. ¶ 21. 
108 Id. ¶ 29. 
109 Id. ¶¶ 16, 17, 21. 
110 Id. ¶ 16. 
111 Id. ¶ 4 (citing Fernández de Gurmendi, supra note 12, at 428-29, and David 
Donat-Cattin, Article 75: Reparations to Victims, in COMMENTARY TO THE 
ROME STATUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 969 (Otto Triffterer 
ed., 1999)).  
112 Id. ¶ 10. 
113 Id. ¶ 30. 
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nario in which the Trial Chamber could be forced to make deter-
minations based on evidence which is outside of the scope the 
charges [sic] against the Accused.”114  Judge Blattman noted that 
defining victims vaguely or preliminarily equally failed to 
“provid[e] tangible benefits for victims . . . .”115  Additionally, ele-
vating the entitlement of applicants who had “suffered harm not 
linked to the charges in the present case” compromised “the rights 
of those victims who do fulfill the criteria of victims.”116 
¶37 The dissenting opinion pointed out that the majority ruling, 
expanding the grant of the “status of victim” vis-à-vis a case, had 
been rendered in the absence of any argument from the OTP, the 
defense, or victims’ representatives in favor of the liberalized stan-
dard.117  Judge Blattman noted that both Pre-Trial Chambers I and 
II “have required, in order to determine the status of victims, that a 
causal link be found between the harm a victim applicant has suf-
fered and the crimes that the accused has been charged with.”118  
The Appeals Chamber also had “never overruled this important 
causal link” in any of the interlocutory appeals it had heard.119 
¶38 Finally, Judge Blattman noted his view that the framework 
created by the majority opinion would tend “to cause delays and 
legal insecurities,"120 and was “over burdensome” for victims.121  
He stated that the framework adopted by the majority “appears to 
be requiring two applications of victims”: one “to be recognized by 
the Trial Chamber as a victim who may generally participate in the 
proceedings,” and a second “to indicate at what specific stage in 
the proceedings they may participate as victims.”122  The majority 
opinion thus “adopt[ed] a system in which every application is to 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for every procedural ac-
tion.”123  Rather than providing “a solution for modalities of par-
                                                 
114 Id. ¶ 11. 
115 Id. ¶ 10. 
116 Id. ¶ 32. 
117 See id. ¶ 28 (stating that none of the “submissions from the parties and par-
ticipants [had] requested or argued for the position that victims’ status in a par-
ticular case would not be tied to whether the harm suffered is a result of the 
charges confirmed against the Accused.”) 
118 Id. ¶ 17. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. ¶ 31. 
121 See id. ¶¶ 22, 32. 
122 Id. ¶ 22. 
123 Id. ¶ 31. 
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ticipation,” the majority ruling, in Judge Blattman’s view, “instead 
postpone[d] decisions for future determination.”124  The dissenting 
Judge emphasized his belief that the Rome Statute rendered it 
mandatory, not elective, to consider burdens and inefficiency when 
determining “at what stage during the trial proceedings it is appro-
priate for victims to present any views or concerns,” since appro-
priateness depended on factors including the factor of judicial 
economy.125 
E. The Positions of the Parties 
¶39 As the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers were assessing the first 
applications to participate in ICC investigations and cases, both the 
OTP and defense counsel assigned in the situations and cases had 
been making observations and arguments, most notably under RPE 
Rule 89(1), which entitles the parties to comment upon applica-
tions.126  The OTP and defense counsel had strongly opposed the 
ruling that the Statute recognizes the granting of a “status of vic-
tim” or “procedural status of victim,” or a general right to partici-
pate, in ICC investigations.127  The OTP and defense counsel also 
each disputed the notion that effects on fairness and efficiency are 
irrelevant when determining when to grant a “status of victim,” 
“procedural status of victim,” or a general or potential right to par-
ticipate, and only should be considered when later determining the 
modalities of participation.128  Indeed, by the time the Pre-Trial 
Chambers assigned to the DRC and Darfur situations granted, in 
essence, leave to appeal these issues, the OTP and defense counsel 
                                                 
124 Id.  
125 See id. ¶ 25. 
126 The rule provides, in pertinent part, “Subject to the provisions of the Statute, 
in particular article 68, paragraph 1, the Registrar shall provide a copy of the 
application to the Prosecutor and the defence, who shall be entitled to reply 
within a time limit to be set by the Chamber.  Subject to the provisions of sub-
rule 2, the Chamber shall then specify the proceedings and manner in which 
participation is considered appropriate . . . .”  See RPE, supra note 17, R. 89(1). 
127 See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the OTP 
position that there is no general right to participate in the investigation and infra 
note 154 and accompanying text for a discussion of the position of Lubanga’s 
pre-trial counsel that victim participation is improper even at the pre-trial stage. 
128 See infra note 139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the OTP posi-
tion and infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the posi-
tion of Lubanga’s pre-trial counsel. 
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had previously filed unsuccessful applications for leave to ap-
peal.129 
¶40 From its first submissions on the issue to Pre-Trial Chamber 
I in 2005, the OTP contested the legality of granting a general right 
to victims to participate in the investigation or situation.  The OTP 
contended that whether an applicant’s “personal interests” were 
“affected,” within the meaning of Article 68(3), could not be de-
termined except in reference to a “proceeding,” which in turn 
could not be equated with the “investigation.”130  The OTP argued, 
for example, that because Article 68(3) was clearly meant to im-
pose some limitation upon participation in ICC proceedings, the 
provision could not be read to permit participation for victims of 
any crime within the theoretical jurisdiction of the Court without 
violating the principle of treaty interpretation requiring every treaty 
provision to be given effect.131  The OTP took the view in its early 
submissions that in the investigation phase, participation by vic-
                                                 
129 See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Situation No. ICC 
01/04-103, Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 
“Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, 
VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6,” Public (Jan. 23, 2006) [here-
inafter OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal]; Situation 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Situation No. ICC-01/04-141, Prosecu-
tion’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 
2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, Public (Apr. 24, 2006); Situation in 
Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-103, Prosecution’s Application for Leave to 
Appeal the Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, 
a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, 
Public (Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter OTP’s 20 August 2007 Uganda Submission 
re Leave to Appeal]; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06-272, Request for Leave to Appeal the “Décision sur les demandes 
de participation à la procedure a/0001/06, a/0002/06, et a/0003/06 dans le cadre 
de l’affaire Le Procureur v. Thomas Lubanga et de l’enquête en République dé-
mocratique du Congo,” Public (Aug. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Defense 7 August 
2006 Lubanga Submission re Leave to Appeal]. 
130 See, e.g., Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-84-Conf, Prosecution’s Reply on the Applications for Participation 01/04-
1/dp to 01/04-6/dp, Reclassified as Public, ¶¶ 11-17 (Aug. 15, 2005) [hereinafter 
OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission] (arguing that there are no “proceed-
ings” within the meaning of Article 68(3) during the investigation phase); Situa-
tion in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-85, Prosecution’s Reply under Rule 
89(1) to the Applications for Participation of Applicants a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to 
a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to 1/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06 in the Uganda 
Situation, Public, ¶ 22 (Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter OTP’s 28 February 2007 
Uganda Submission] (“the investigation of a situation is a phase which does not 
form part of the concept of proceedings as defined in [Art. 68(3)]”). 
131 See, e.g., OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 25; 
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 29. 
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tims was permissible, but only in the “proceedings” specifically 
identified in the Rome Statute and the RPE, for example: 
 Through presentation of views when the OTP seeks 
authorization to commence an investigation proprio 
motu, under Article 15(3); 
 By being informed if the OTP decides not to inves-
tigate or prosecute (see Article 53; Rule 92(2)), and 
being heard on that matter; 
 Through submission of observations when the OTP 
seeks a ruling from the Court regarding a question 
of jurisdiction or admissibility, under Article 
19(3).132 
The granting of a general right to participate in the investigation, in 
the view of the OTP, wrongly made redundant these provisions in 
the Statute and RPE specifying instances of victims’ participation 
relating to the investigation.133 
¶41 The OTP’s argument relied on the proposition that the clear 
design of the Rome Statute was to increase or expand victims’ par-
ticipation as investigations and cases advanced to the proceedings 
in which participation was most vital to victims—trial and hearings 
relating to reparations.134  During the earliest phase of investiga-
tion, victims thus were expressly granted rights to be heard only 
regarding specific matters in which their interests were plainly “af-
fected,” such as the commencing of an investigation proprio motu 
or the declining of an investigation on interests-of-justice 
grounds.135  To grant a general right to participate in the investiga-
                                                 
132 See, e.g., OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 5, 54; 
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 20. 
133 See, e.g., OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 15; 
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 27. 
134 See, e.g., OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 11-22; 
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 20-27; Situa-
tion in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Situation No. ICC-01/04-346, Prose-
cution’s Reply under Rule 89(1) to the Applications for Participation of Appli-
cants a/0106/06 to a/0110/06, a/0128/06 to a/0162/06, a/0188/06, a/0199/06, 
a/0203/06, a/0209/06, a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to a/0222/06 and a/0224/06 to 
a/0250/06, Public Redacted Version, ¶¶ 13-14 (June 25, 2007) [hereinafter 
OTP’s 25 June 2007 DRC Submission]; OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Sub-
mission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 21-22.  
135 See, e.g., OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 5, 54; 
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 20. 
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tion, by contrast, failed to acknowledge that providing ill-defined 
participation during that early phase would undermine the inde-
pendence of the Prosecutor, the objectivity of the investigation, 
and the efficiency of the Court.136  It also created forms of partici-
pation that approached or surpassed the partie civile system re-
jected at Rome: for example, a victim’s ability during an investiga-
tion to submit to the judges factual material collected outside of the 
prosecutor’s investigation and unrelated to any crimes actually be-
ing investigated.137  The granting of an open-ended participation 
right during the investigation, in the OTP’s view, upended the ra-
tional plan of the Statute to focus the Court’s limited resources on 
providing greater participation rights to victims who had suffered 
from crimes specifically prosecuted at the ICC.138 
¶42 The OTP also contended that Article 68(3) did not permit the 
Chambers to decline to consider how granting a general right to 
participate might affect the fairness and efficiency of proceedings, 
and to rely instead on a sweeping judgment that such a right was 
not per se at odds with fair and expeditious proceedings.139  Be-
cause of the breadth of the general right, ICC proceedings could be 
debilitated, the OTP argued, by the need to adjudicate, in succes-
sive steps, the participation rights of the hundreds of thousands of 
victims of the conflicts under investigation.140  Moreover, given the 
extreme selectivity of cases actually commenced in the ICC, if the 
                                                 
136 See, e.g., OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, su-
pra note 129, ¶¶ 5, 13-19, 31; OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, 
supra note 130, ¶¶ 32-33; OTP’s 20 August 2007 Uganda Submission re Leave 
to Appeal supra note 129, ¶¶ 13-14. 
137 See, e.g., OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, su-
pra note 129, ¶¶ 17, 21; OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra 
note 130, ¶ 38 n.60. 
138 See, e.g., OTP’s 15 August 2005 DRC Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 18-22 
(arguing that the drafting history of Article 68 demonstrates the intent to provide 
greater participation in case proceedings); OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Sub-
mission re Leave to Appeal, supra note 129, ¶ 5 (contending that 17 January 
2006 DRC Decision wrongly granted participation “regardless of whether the 
person demonstrates any connection to the actual focus of the investigation at 
the time, or any future case” and thus opened the right to tens of thousands, or 
hundreds of thousands of individuals in the DRC).  
139 See, e.g., OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, su-
pra note 129, ¶ 22 (stating that it is “no satisfactory solution” for the Chamber to 
“merely state[] that it must arrange for the victims to take part in a way that re-
spects the rights of the defence . . . .”). 
140 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 5, 31-33; OTP’s 25 June 2007 DRC Submission, supra note 
134, ¶¶ 22-25.  
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Chambers persisted in the dominant view that case participation 
would only be conferred on victims who suffered from charged 
crimes, only the smallest fraction of those who participated in an 
investigation would ever qualify to participate in any ICC case.141  
The OTP argued that it was unfair to victims, as well as damaging 
for the Court, to raise false expectations by granting a general right 
to participate that was highly unlikely to lead to any opportunity to 
express views or concerns in ICC trials or to the receipt of repara-
tions.142 
¶43 Finally, the OTP maintained that permitting general 
participation in the investigation, or the “procedural status of vic-
tim,” also undermined the fairness and integrity of ICC proceed-
ings, in that: 
 The burden of processing the applications for par-
ticipation, and managing the ensuing participation, 
would not be offset by meaningful victims’ partici-
pation;143 
 It prejudiced the defense to grant to victims the abil-
ity to participate in investigations, and present facts 
to the Chambers, without subjecting that participa-
tion to safeguards which apply to the OTP (such as 
the obligation to investigate exonerating circum-
stances under Article 54(1)(a)), or to both parties 
(such as duties of disclosure);144 
                                                 
141 See, e.g., Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-315, Prosecution’s 
Observations on the Applications for Participation of Applicants a/0004/06 to 
a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06, a/0071/06, a/0072/06 to a/0080/06 and 
a/0105/06, Public with Confidential, Ex parte Annex, ¶ 20 (Nov. 30, 2006); 
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 12. 
142 See, e.g., Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-315, Prosecution’s 
Observations on the Applications for Participation of Applicants a/0004/06 to 
a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06, a/0071/06, a/0072/06 to a/0080/06 and 
a/0105/06, Public with Confidential, Ex parte Annex, ¶ 20 (Nov. 30, 2006); 
OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 12. 
143 See, e.g., OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶¶ 
12-14, 40; OTP’s 25 June 2007 DRC Submission, supra note 134, ¶¶ 12-14, 22-
24. 
144 See, e.g., OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, su-
pra note 129, ¶¶ 10, 13-22; OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, supra 
note 130, ¶¶ 32-33, 38-39; OTP’s 20 August 2007 Uganda Submission re Leave 
to Appeal, supra note 129, ¶¶ 13-14. 
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 It damaged the judges’ appearance of impartiality, 
and ignored that the Statute conferred no authority 
upon the judges to conduct investigation, to permit 
the judges to rule upon the existence of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of victims 
of those crimes, before any defendant is present or 
the OTP has presented any evidence.145 
¶44 After the Lubanga case commenced and applications to 
participate in the situations and cases came under consideration, 
defense counsel also strongly challenged the standards selected by 
the judges for evaluating applications to participate. 146  In particu-
lar, the lawyers who have represented Lubanga, as well as the 
OPCD, in representing future defendants in the Darfur and DRC 
situations,147 have contended that: (1) the applications to partici-
                                                 
145 See, e.g., OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, su-
pra note 129, ¶¶ 14, 16, 26-27; OTP’s 28 February 2007 Uganda Submission, 
supra note 130, ¶¶ 35-37.  
146 The first two times the “status of victim” was granted–in the 17 January 2006 
DRC Decision and 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision–the Pre-Trial Chamber 
had before it no argument that opposed the granting of a general right to partici-
pate in the investigation. The relevant filing by ad hoc counsel in the DRC case 
is not public, but is referenced in the 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 
26, which notes that ad hoc defense counsel did not “challenge either the appli-
cability of article 68(3) of the Statute to this stage of the investigation or the 
possibility in legal terms of participation by the victims at this stage of the pro-
ceedings.”  See id. ¶ 24.  In the Uganda situation and case, from the public filing 
of ad hoc defense counsel it appears that she believed that a public information 
document issued in 2005 by the ICC, which stated that victims could participate 
“from the earliest stages of the proceedings,” precluded “the Defence [from 
submitting] arguments against victim participation at all stages in the proceed-
ings.” See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-216-tEN, De-
fence observations on applications for participation in the proceedings 
a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to 
a/0127/06, Public, ¶¶ 43-46 (Mar. 5, 2007).  The lack of opposition by these first 
defense counsel, especially given the subsequent objections raised by counsel 
for Lubanga and OPCD, see infra notes 147-78 and accompanying text, may 
reflect the difficulty that ad hoc counsel often faces in representing abstract in-
terests. 
147 The OPCD was first appointed in the Darfur and DRC situations in May 
2007 to represent the interests of defendants during the investigation by replying 
to observations to participate.  See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. 
ICC-02/05-74, Decision Authorising the Filing of Observations on Applications 
for Participation in the Proceedings a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, Public, 3 (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, May 23, 2007); Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-329-
tEN, Decision Authorising the Filing of Observations on Applications for Par-
ticipation in the Proceedings, Public, 3 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, May 23, 2007) 
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pate, and the accounts contained therein, prejudice defendants by 
exposing the judges to “accusers” other than the OTP;148 (2) it is 
extra-legal to grant the status of victim based on collective “ef-
fects” shared by all victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court;149 and (3) the process of evaluating applications is burden-
some to the defense and delays proceedings and trials, which also 
prejudices the defense.150 
¶45 Lubanga’s pre-trial counsel, whose defense of Lubanga was 
vigorous, was the first to argue that applicants seeking participa-
tion inevitably and wrongly served as other “accusers” of the de-
fendant, in providing accounts of their victimization.151  Lubanga’s 
pre-trial counsel argued that the prejudice was compounded be-
cause the names of applicants were withheld from the defense (a 
practice routinely ordered at the ICC to maintain the security of the 
applicants), meaning that applicants functioned as anonymous ac-
cusers.152  Lubanga’s counsel noted that many applicants had ad-
vanced accusations about the UPC, the group Lubanga had led, and 
some recounted crimes like murder, rape, and torture, that were not 
among the only charges in the case: child conscription, child 
enlistment, and use of children in hostilities.153 
                                                                                                             
[hereinafter 23 May 2007 DRC Decision Authorizing Observations]. 
148 See infra notes 151-53 & 162-65 and accompanying text.  
149 See, e.g., Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-119, OPCD Ap-
peal Brief on the “Decision on the Requests of the OPCD on the Production of 
Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the 
Regulations of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the 
Prosecutor,” Public,  ¶¶ 20-21 (Feb. 4, 2008) [hereinafter 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD 
Darfur Appeal Brief]; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06-901-tEN, Response to the Application by Victims a/0001/06, 
a/0002/06, a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 for Authorization to Participate in the Ap-
peal Proceedings Relating to the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pub-
lic, ¶¶ 23-25 (May 11, 2006) [hereinafter Defense 11 May 2006 Lubanga Re-
sponse]. 
150 See infra notes 159-60 & 174 and accompanying text. 
151 See, e.g., Defense 7 August 2006 Lubanga Submission re Leave to Appeal, 
supra note 129, ¶ 45. Counsel in the pre-trial stage was Jean Flamme.  See id. at 
1. 
152 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 7, 36-47; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06-386-tEN, Defence Submissions regarding the Applications for 
Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0004/06 to a/0052/06, Public, 
¶¶ 1-4 (Sept. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Defense 4 September 2006 Lubanga Submis-
sion re Applicants a/0004/06 to a/0052/06]. 
153 See, e.g., Defense 4 September 2006 Lubanga Submission re Applicants 
a/0004/06 to a/0052/06, supra note 152, ¶¶ 73-77; Prosecutor v. Thomas Luban-
ga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-585, Observations de la Défense sur les 
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¶46 The position of Lubanga’s pre-trial counsel was that victim 
participation during pre-trial proceedings should be disallowed and 
participation commenced following the confirmation of charges.154  
Counsel noted that applicants to participate were indiscriminately 
seeking to participate equally in all phases of proceedings, rather 
than making any attempt to show the effects of any proceeding on 
“personal interests.”155  Also, in counsel’s estimation, it “put the 
cart before the horse” to grant victim status while deferring any 
evaluation of the impact on the defense and on efficiency until the 
Chamber considered “modalities” of participation in specific pro-
ceedings.156  Counsel stated: “the Pre-Trial Chamber should not 
conduct a purely theoretical and ‘in abstracto’ examination of the 
issue of whether, generally speaking, it is appropriate to participate 
in the pre-trial stage.”157  Lubanga’s counsel argued that it under-
mined the appearance of the impartiality of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
and Lubanga’s right to the presumption of innocence for the 
Chamber to find, before the confirmation of any charges, that cer-
tain applicants to participate had suffered harm as a result of the 
crimes allegedly perpetrated by Lubanga.158 
¶47 Lubanga’s counsel argued further that especially, but not 
uniquely, in the circumstances Lubanga faced, participation at the 
pre-trial stage could not be accomplished without “undue delay” of 
the proceedings and infringement of Lubanga’s rights.159  Counsel 
repeatedly complained before Lubanga’s confirmation hearing that 
the burden of responding to applications to participate, and the 
                                                                                                             
demandes de participation à la procédure a/0072/06 à a/0080/06 et a/0105/06, 
Public, ¶¶ 21-27 (Oct. 18, 2006). 
154 See, e.g., Defense 7 August 2006 Lubanga Submission re Leave to Appeal, 
supra note 129, ¶ 10; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06-379, Defence Observations Relative to the Proceedings and Manner 
of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06, Public, ¶¶ 22-26 (Sept. 4, 
2006) [hereinafter Defense 4 September 2006 Lubanga Submission re Appli-
cants a/0001/06 to a/0003/06].   
155 See Defense 11 May 2006 Lubanga Response, supra note 149, ¶¶ 23-25.  
156 Defense 7 August 2006 Lubanga Submission re Leave to Appeal, supra note 
129, ¶ 49. 
157 Defense 4 September 2006 Lubanga Submission re Applicants a/0001/06 to 
a/0003/06, supra note 154, ¶ 25. 
158 See, e.g., Defense 4 September 2006 Lubanga Submission re Applicants 
a/0004/06 to a/0052/06, supra note 152, ¶¶ 50-53.  
159 See, e.g., Defense 7 August 2006 Lubanga Submission re Leave to Appeal, 
supra note 120, ¶¶ 50-53. 
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“potentially detrimental” allegations raised therein, was impairing 
the defense’s preparation for the hearing.160 
¶48 The OPCD, while serving as ad hoc counsel to as-yet 
theoretical defendants in the DRC and Darfur situations, made a 
series of objections through which it finally obtained leave to chal-
lenge the notion, first expressed in the January 17, 2006 decision 
of Pre-Trial Chamber I, that there was nothing inherently unfair in 
permitting the “procedural status of victim.”161  When the first ap-
plications to participate in the Darfur situation were under consid-
eration, in June 2007, the OPCD contended that the “the participa-
tion of the victims at this stage of the proceedings would prejudice 
the rights of the Defence.”162  In nearly identical filings in the DRC 
and Darfur situations, the OPCD also challenged the application 
process, contending that the Chambers could not rule on the appli-
cations without considering information which might contradict 
the applicants’ claims.163  The OPCD sought to have the judges re-
quire applicants to participate to disclose information which might 
tend to impugn their own credibility or establish that injuries were 
pre-existing.164  It requested that the Chambers order the OTP to 
                                                 
160 See id. ¶¶ 50-51; see also Defense 4 September 2006 Lubanga Submission re 
Applicants a/0001/06 to a/0003/06, supra note 154, ¶¶ 25-26 (noting that con-
firmation hearing had been postponed once already and that the admission of 
victim-participants would “inevitably delay them further” and deprive the de-
fense of “the means and resources . . . to ensure the accused’s right to a defence 
as guaranteed by the Statute”).  
161 See First Darfur Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 6-7; First DRC Grant of 
Appeal, supra note 1, at 6-7.  Presumably the OPCD was referring to the pre-
trial phase, as arrest warrants had been issued in that situation. 
162 The quotation in the text is the Single Judge’s characterization, as stated in 
the 6 December 2007 Darfur decision, supra note 82, at 4, but the OPCD sub-
mission—a filing entitled “Observations on Applications a/0011/06 to 
a/0015/06,” numbered ICC-02/05-80-Conf, and dated 8 June 2007, see id. at 4 
n.9–is not publicly available.    
163 See OPCD Darfur Request for Addt’l Information from Applicants, supra 
note 79; OPCD Darfur Request for Exculpatory Materials, supra note 79; Situa-
tion in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-382, Request for the Single Judge to 
Order the Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regu-
lation 86(2)(e), Public (Aug. 31, 2007) [hereinafter OPCD DRC Request for 
Addt’l Information from Applicants]; Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-
01/04-378, Request for Single Judge to Order the Prosecutor to Disclose Excul-
patory Materials, Public (Aug. 28, 2007) [hereinafter OPCD DRC Request for 
Exculpatory Materials]. 
164 See, e.g., OPCD DRC Request for Addt’l Information from Applicants, supra 
note 163, ¶ 81 (seeking information of any pre-existing medical condition suf-
fered by applicant, national investigations or convictions of applicant, and rela-
tionships between applicant and other applicants). 
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disclose information that might undermine applicants’ claims that 
the acts from which they suffered were crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  The OPCD specified, for example, that it sought in-
formation from the OTP suggesting that there was no “armed con-
flict” in the DRC or that the villages mentioned in the applications 
had been legitimate military targets.165 
¶49 The OPCD applications were rejected by Single Judges in 
both the Darfur and DRC situations, based on identical reasoning: 
that because the process of admitting victims to participate “is not 
related to questions pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the sus-
pect or accused person or to the credibility of Prosecution wit-
nesses,” it was unnecessary to expand the information-seeking 
which precedes decisions on applications to participate.166  On Jan-
uary 23, 2008, however, the same judges granted leave to appeal 
their denial of the OPCD motions, and particularly the issue of 
whether a “procedural status of victim” can be granted during the 
investigation or in pre-trial proceedings.167  This was the set of de-
cisions that also sought appellate guidance on “how applications 
for participation at the investigation stage of a situation and the 
pre-trial stage of a case must be dealt with.”168  On February 6, 
2008, the Single Judges in the Darfur and DRC situations again 
                                                 
165 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 25-38; OPCD Darfur Request for Exculpatory Materials, su-
pra note 79, ¶¶ 29-40. 
166 3 December 2007 Darfur Decision on OPCD Requests for Addt’l and Excul-
patory Information, supra note 76, ¶ 20; Situation in the DRC, Situation No. 
ICC-01/04-417, Decision on the Requests of the OPCD on the Production of 
Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the 
Regulations of the Court and on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the 
Prosecutor, Public, ¶ 11 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Dec. 7, 2007) [hereinafter DRC 
Decision on OPCD Requests for Addt’l and Exculpatory Information].  
167 See First Darfur Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 7-8; First DRC Grant of 
Appeal, supra note 1, at 7-8.  Pre-Trial Chamber I, in the DRC situation, and the 
Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber II, in the Uganda situation, had previously 
declined to permit appeal of the same issue, insofar as it concerned investiga-
tion.  See Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-135-tEN, Decision on 
the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Chamber’s Decision of 
17 January 2006 on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings  of 
VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, Public (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Mar. 31, 2006); Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-112, 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on 
Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, 
a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber 
II, Dec. 19, 2007). 
168 First Darfur Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 8; First DRC Grant of Appeal, 
supra note 1, at 8. 
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granted leave to appeal the same issues, after the OPCD and OTP 
sought leave to appeal the December 6, 2007 decision of the Single 
Judge in the Darfur situation,169 and the OPCD, the OTP and vic-
tims’ representatives sought leave to appeal a December 24, 2007 
decision by the Single Judge in the DRC situation, which under-
took to decide approximately 140 applications for victims’ partici-
pation.170 
¶50 In briefs filed in support of the pending appeals, the OPCD 
and the OTP are thus joined in arguing that the Chambers have 
erred in creating a “procedural status of victim” which is nowhere 
recognized in the Rome Statute or the RPE171 and which wrongly 
relies, as the OPCD has put it, “on generic presumptions concern-
ing all applicants, and all situation and pre-trial phases at the ICC,” 
rather than on a “specific determination” regarding “personal inter-
ests” affected by an actual proceeding in the situation or pre-trial 
phase.172  The parties also are agreed that the Statute requires a 
Chamber to determine, with respect to concrete proceedings, and 
in a single step, the personal interests and the appropriateness of 
the participation, given likely effects on the defense and the pro-
ceedings as a whole.173  Both the OTP and the defense have called 
attention to the illogic, and the waste, in determining and granting 
the “status of victim” in relation to hypothetical “proceedings.”174 
                                                 
169 See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-121, Decision on the 
Requests for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the Application for Participation 
of Victims in the Proceedings in the Situation, Public, 4-5, 11 (Pre-Trial Cham-
ber I, Feb. 6, 2008). 
170 See Situation in the DRC, Case No. ICC-01/04-444, Decision on the Prosecu-
tion, OPCD, and OPCV Requests for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the Ap-
plications for Participation of Victims in the Proceedings in the Situation, Pub-
lic, 6, 15 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Feb. 6, 2008).  
171 See, e.g., 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶ 23; 
Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-125, Prosecution’s Docu-
ment in Support of Appeal against the 6 December 2007 Decision on the Vic-
tims’ Applications for Participation in the Proceedings, Public, ¶ 14 (Feb. 18, 
2008) [hereinafter 18 Feb. 2008 OTP Appeal Brief].  
172 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶¶ 18-21. 
173 See, e.g., 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶¶ 18-20; 
18 Feb. 2008 OTP Appeal Brief, supra note 171, ¶¶ 17-18. 
174 See, e.g., 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶¶ 19, 21; 
18 Feb. 2008 OTP Appeal Brief, supra note 171, ¶ 35.  Ad hoc defense counsel 
appointed in the Uganda situation has also taken this view in appealing the Sec-
ond Decision re Uganda Participation. See Defense Request for Leave to Appeal 
Second Decision re Uganda Participation, supra note 75, ¶ 30 (“If there are no 
possible proceedings in which an applicant may participate or which require a 
formal determination as to the victim’s status, issuing a general decision which 
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¶51 On appeal, the OPCD has argued it would better protect the 
rights of the defense, as well as the impartiality of the Chambers, if 
views and concerns of victims during the investigation were di-
rected at the OTP, which is charged with statutory obligations to 
seek truth, to investigate exonerating circumstances, and to dis-
close exonerating information.175  During the investigation phase, 
the OPCD has emphasized, the defense is indeed reliant on the 
triggering of the OTP’s statutory obligations, because it “does not 
have the possibility at the situation phase to challenge jurisdiction, 
conduct investigations, or (as concluded by the Honourable Single 
Judge) request disclosure from either the Prosecution or the appli-
cants.”176 
¶52 Additionally, the OPCD has contended that the opining of 
ICC judges on allegations not related to any commenced ICC case 
is inappropriate.  According to the OTP, the ICC should not under-
take to make pronouncements on matters that would “normally fall 
purely within the competence of domestic authorities,” especially 
in light of the fact that the ICC “has neither the obligation nor the 
power to give effect to the right to a remedy for every potential 
victim” within the territory of any State-party.177  The OPCD has 
argued that overly broad victims’ participation, defined in relation 
to all crimes within the potential jurisdiction of the Court rather 
than “the overarching objectives (and limitations) of the ICC it-
self,” cannot help but begin to transform the ICC into “a broad 
based forum for litigating all alleged violations of international 
criminal law . . . .” or a “quasi-truth and reconciliation forum.”178 
¶53 More recently, Lubanga’s defense counsel has had the 
opportunity to address the ruling of Trial Chamber I establishing 
standards for victim’s participation in the Lubanga case.  By order 
dated February 26, 2008, Trial Chamber I granted the OPCD and 
the OTP leave to appeal the January 18, 2008 decision.179  Specifi-
                                                                                                             
will never be implemented in practice affects the expeditious conduct of the pro-
ceedings, resulting in waste of time and resources for the Court instead of con-
centrating on concrete rights.”).  
175 See, e.g., 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶¶ 37-48. 
176 See id. ¶ 43. 
177 See id. ¶¶ 48-54. 
178 See id. ¶¶ 3-5, 53-54. 
179 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1191, De-
cision on the Defence and Prosecution Requests for Leave to Appeal the Deci-
sion on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, Public (Trial Chamber I, Feb. 
26, 2008) [hereinafter Decision Granting Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Par-
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cally, Trial Chamber I granted leave to appeal the question of 
“whether the harm alleged by a victim and the concept of ‘personal 
interests’ under Article 68 of the Statute must be linked with 
charges against the accused.”180  The parties also obtained leave to 
address “whether it is possible for victims participating at trial to 
lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused 
and to challenge the admissibility or relevance of evidence.”181  
The Appeals Chamber is thus poised to consider the breadth of vic-
tims’ participation in cases and investigations and the proper rela-
tion between the standards governing participation in those two 
phases. 
¶54 Notably, while the Pre-Trial Chambers had deemed the topic 
of the proper definition of “personal interests” worthy of appeal 
mainly because of potential effects on the efficiency of proceed-
ings,182 Trial Chamber I openly acknowledged that the issue af-
fected fairness to the defense.  Trial Chamber I confirmed that its 
decision of January 18, 2008 contemplated permitting victims to 
introduce evidence at trial,183 and expressed that the extent of vic-
tims’ participation was bound to alter the content and length of the 
case, by “affect[ing] the nature and extent of the evidence called 
and the issues raised.”184  The Trial Chamber conceded that while 
“the impugned decision does not have the effect per se of shifting 
the burden of proof,” the decision “could lead, in particular cir-
cumstances and in some degree, to such an effect, and this could 
                                                                                                             
ticipation Decision].  In the trial phase, Lubanga has been represented by Cath-
erine Mabille.  See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06-932-tENG, Registration of Solemn Undertaking by Ms Catherine Mabille 
and of Her Undertaking Under Article 22(3) of the Code of Professional Con-
duct for Counsel, Public (Trial Chamber I, July 6, 2007). 
180 See Decision Granting Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Participation Deci-
sion, supra note 179, ¶¶ 29-34, 54. 
181 See id. ¶¶ 39-42, 54.  Trial Chamber I granted leave to appeal a third issue:  
“Whether the notion of victim necessarily implies the existence of personal and 
direct harm.”  See id. ¶¶ 26-28, 54.  
182 See, e.g., First Darfur Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 6-8 (characterizing 
issue as involving “risk of consecutive multiple applications [to participate]” 
which in turn affects “the efficient and effective operation of the Court as a 
whole”); First DRC Grant of Appeal, supra note 1, at 6-8 (same). 
183 See Decision Granting Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Participation Deci-
sion, supra note 179, ¶ 42 (analyzing whether the fair and expeditious conduct 
of proceedings would be affected by “the introduction of evidence touching on 
the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused” and “considering evidence 
that otherwise would not be available”).  
184 See id. ¶ 33. 
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significantly affect the fairness of the proceedings pursuant to Ar-
ticle 67(1)(i) of the Statute.”185 
¶55 On the topic of whether participation at trial must be 
conditioned on harm suffered as a result of a charged crime, 
Lubanga’s trial counsel has relied extensively upon Judge Blatt-
man’s reasoning that it exceeds the competence of the ICC, imper-
ils the fairness of ICC proceedings, and violates fundamental prin-
ciples of criminal law, including the principle of legality, to fail to 
require the link.186  Lubanga’s counsel has contended, in addition, 
that to permit victims to become witnesses and sources of evi-
dence: (1) fails to observe the limitation that victims participate by 
voicing “views and concerns,” and that witnesses may only be 
questioned with approval of the Chamber, and only when their per-
sonal interests are affected;187 (2) accords rights to victims which 
the legislator clearly had intended to reserve to the parties;188 and 
(3) wrongly relieves the Prosecution of its unique burden of prov-
ing the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.189 
III. ICC PERFORMANCE IN PROVIDING MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION 
¶56 Pre-Trial Chamber I aspired in its January 17, 2006 decision 
to afford a “right of access” to victims and “to enable them to ex-
ercise that right concretely and effectively.”190  Over two years 
later, this objective has not been met, nor is it certain that it can be 
                                                 
185 Id. ¶ 42.  
186 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1135, 
Requête de la Défense solicitant l’autorisation d’interjeter appel de la « Decision 
on Victims’ Participation » rendue le 18 janvier 2008, Public, ¶¶ 29-30 (Jan. 28, 
2008), [hereinafter Defense Request for Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Partici-
pation Decision]; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06-1220, Acte d’appel de la Défense relativement à la Décision du 18 janvier 
2008 de la Chambre de première instance I concernant la participation des vic-
times, Public, ¶¶ 34-39 (Mar. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Defense Brief in Support of 
Appeal of Lubanga Trial Participation Decision].  
187 See Defense Request for Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Participation Deci-
sion, supra note 186, ¶¶ 42-43; Defense Brief in Support of Appeal of Lubanga 
Trial Participation Decision, supra note 186, ¶¶ 45-47. 
188 See Defense Request for Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Participation Deci-
sion, supra note 186, ¶ 44; Defense Brief in Support of Appeal of Lubanga Trial 
Participation Decision, supra note 186, ¶49. 
189 See Defense Request for Leave to Appeal Lubanga Trial Participation Deci-
sion, supra note 186, ¶ 42; Defense Brief in Support of Appeal of Lubanga Trial 
Participation Decision, supra note 186, ¶ 48. 
190 See 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 71.  
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met.  Victims’ participation has been substantive and unique in 
some case proceedings, such as Lubanga’s confirmation hearing 
and pre-trial proceedings.  The considerable effort expended by the 
judges and the participants in attempting to define and provide 
meaningful victims’ participation, however, has not yielded a co-
herent or workable system of providing concrete participation.  
The progression of decisions of the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers 
reflects an evolution from conviction that broad participation can 
be conferred, to uncertainty in the first standards chosen, to hope 
that the Appeals Chamber will find solutions from among the dis-
parate, potentially controversial, and burdensome standards im-
plemented by the lower Chambers. 
¶57 Facts not acknowledged by the Chambers are also a source 
of unease.  The filing of mere hundreds of applications to partici-
pate in ICC proceedings has overburdened the participation 
framework.  The pace of adjudicating the applications is glacial, 
and side litigation over the application process is flourishing.  Nor 
is the unwieldy process yielding benefits for victims.  As of May 1, 
2008, over two years after the first victims’ participation decision, 
substantive participation in proceedings remains limited to a hand-
ful of victims who are participating in the Lubanga case. 
¶58 There are three noteworthy aspects of the ICC’s track record: 
(1) the inability of the Chambers to render timely or effective deci-
sions on applications to participate; (2) the volume and depth of 
litigation regarding matters related to the process of adjudicating 
applications to participate, and the effect of that litigation on Court 
proceedings generally; and (3) the failure of the Court to provide 
meaningful victims’ participation to more victims, or outside the 
instances of participation that are explicitly set forth in the Rome 
Statute. 
A. The Failure to Keep Pace in Processing Applications to 
Participate 
¶59 The most fundamental problem in providing meaningful 
participation to victims has been the inability of the Chambers to 
process applications to participate in a timely fashion, or to gener-
ate decisions resulting in actual participation.  The OTP, in early 
submissions regarding victims’ participation, had raised the specter 
of hundreds of thousands of applicants to participate, given the 
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broad scope of ICC investigations.191  From court records it ap-
pears that approximately five hundred applicants—from among all 
the victims of the conflicts in Darfur, the DRC, northern Uganda 
and the CAR—had sought participation as of this writing, in May 
2008.  That relatively modest number nonetheless has been ample 
to demonstrate the weakness in the participation scheme and to 
burden the Court’s operations.  Also as of May 2008, the Cham-
bers have succeeded in granting less than 110 applicants, in any of 
the ICC’s investigations, even the “status of victim” vis-à-vis the 
investigation, i.e., the theoretical right to participate.  It is not ap-
parent that a single victim has actually participated in an investiga-
tion phase proceeding or provided any view or concern that af-
fected any investigation.  Eighteen victims of the conflicts in the 
DRC, northern Uganda, and Darfur have obtained the “status of 
victim” in case proceedings, and only four of those are actually 
participating, in the Lubanga case.  Finally, applicants typically 
wait for over a year, and some have waited for over a year and a 
half, to learn the disposition of their requests to participate. 
¶60 Applications to participate in ICC proceedings can be 
delayed in one of two places in the ICC: (1) in the Registry, the 
administrative organ of the ICC, because the Registry is the first to 
receive applications and also bears the responsibility of forwarding 
groups of applications to the Chambers, together with a covering 
report required by ICC Regulation 86(5);192 or (2) in Chambers, 
because a Chamber is in the process of receiving observations from 
the parties pursuant to Rule 89(1), has sought supplementation 
from the applicants or the Registry, or has decided to defer consid-
eration.  The relevant figures, drawn from information publicly 
available as of May 1, 2008, are as follows.  (To make it possible 
for this chart to appear on one page, notes to the chart (i.e., notes i 
to viii) appear in an Addendum to this article.) 
                                                 
191 See, e.g., OTP’s 23 January 2006 DRC Submission re Leave to Appeal, su-
pra note 129, ¶ 5 (“Given the massive scale of alleged criminality in the DRC, 
this ruling could result in tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands of indi-
viduals, having the right to participate in the investigation stage.”). 
192 The regulation provides: “The Registrar shall present all applications de-
scribed in this regulation to the Chamber together with a report thereon.  The 
Registrar shall endeavour to present one report for a group of victims, taking 
into consideration the distinct interests of the victims.”  Regulations of the 
Court, adopted on 26 May 2004 by the Judges of the Court, Fifth Plenary Ses-
sion, ICC-BD/01-01-04, Chapter 5, The Hague, 17-28 May 2004, at Reg. 86(5) 
[hereinafter ICC Regulations].  In practice, the preparation of the report has been 
assigned to the VPRS.   
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¶61 These figures demonstrate the following: 
 At least 509 applications to participate in ICC pro-
ceedings, and likely a higher number, have been re-
ceived by the Registry. 193  The number of applica-
tions to participate has been deduced from the iden-
tification numbers assigned by the Registry to ap-
plicants to participate.  For example, in the DRC 
situation, the highest number assigned to an applica-
                                                 
193 One source reported at the end of 2007 that “approximately 500 victims have 
applied to participate in proceedings at the court and most are still waiting to 
find out if they will be accepted.”  IWPR Report, supra note 7.  From the con-
text, it appears that the reported figure was supplied by the Registry.  See id. 
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tion, and known from public filings, is a/0337/07,194 
presumably meaning that at least 337 applicants 
have received “a” or applicant numbers.  The figure 
in the chart is 344 rather than 337 because one 
number with an “08” prefix is known to have been 
assigned,195 and the six applicants who were the 
subject of the 17 January 2006 decision in the DRC 
situation were not assigned “a” numbers, but instead 
received designations “VPRS 1” to “VPRS 6.”196 
 The reason that the first column of the chart likely 
understates the total number of applications is that 
in the Uganda and Darfur situations, the last appli-
cations known to exist because of public court fil-
ings were ones submitted by victims in July 2007 
(see last column of chart).  This means that any ap-
plications received by the Registry in those situa-
tions since mid-2007 are not reflected in the chart.  
Applications received by the Registry since January 
2008 in the DRC situation likewise are not re-
flected. 
 The Chambers have called for the observations of 
the parties on a total of 256 applications, which 
means that about 50% of the 509 applications be-
lieved to have been received by the Registry 
through January 2008 remain pending in the Regis-
try. 
 If one assumes that each applicant has applied to 
participate in all phases of  proceedings (i.e., inves-
tigation, pre-trial proceedings, and case), 197 only 
                                                 
194 See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. 
ICC/01/04-01/07-357, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Pro-
ceedings of Applicants a/0327/07 to a/0337/07 and a/0001/08, Public (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Apr. 2, 2008). 
195 See id. (noting applicant a/0001/08).  There appear to have been a total of 337 
applicants in the DRC situation in the years 2006 and 2007, because no number 
from 1 to 337 is duplicated in those years, despite the change in suffix from “06” 
to “07”.   
196 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, at 1. 
197 It is the practice of most applicants to seek participation in all phases.  For 
example, of the twenty-one applications in the Darfur situation that have been 
considered by the Single Judge, all contained requests “to participate in all stag-
es of the proceedings.” See 6 December 2007 Darfur Decision, supra note 82, ¶ 
8.  The forty-nine applications so far considered in the Uganda situation each 
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104, or 20%, of applicants to participate have ob-
tained even a theoretical right to participate in an 
investigation.  Only eighteen, or 4%, of applicants 
who submitted their applications before July 2007 
have obtained even a theoretical right to participate 
in an ICC case. 
 The Chambers have yet to make final determina-
tions regarding the status of victim, in the situation 
and case, on well over half of the applications 
which were filed with the Registry between June 
2005 and January 2008 and remain pending before 
the Chambers. 
¶62 One dimension not adequately depicted in the numbers of 
applications processed is the extent of the delay between the sub-
mission of the application and the issuance of any decision either 
to grant “the status of victim” or to deny it, in either the situation 
or the case.  Most applicants wait more than a year to obtain the 
theoretical right to participate, in either the situation or the case, 
and for many applicants the process is circular and time-
consuming because the Chamber’s “decision” is to defer consid-
eration of the application or to deem it incomplete.  For example, 
in the DRC situation, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued, on December 24, 
2007, a decision initially addressing one group of 140 applications 
to participate in proceedings.198  All 140 applications had been 
                                                                                                             
sought participation at all stages of the proceedings. See Prosecutor v. Joseph 
Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-134, Decision on Legal Representation, Ap-
pointment of Counsel for the Defence, Protective Measures, and Time-Limit for 
Submission of Observations on Applications for Participation a/0010/06, 
a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06, and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, 
Public, ¶ 1 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, Feb. 1, 2007).  The largest group of applica-
tions forwarded to the parties for the making of observations consisted of sev-
enty-five applications in the DRC situation. See 23 May 2007 DRC Decision 
Authorizing Observations, supra note 147.  Of that group, according to the 
OTP’s submission under Rule 89(1), sixty-five applicants sought to participate 
in the investigation, sixty-eight sought to participate in the pre-trial phase, and 
seventy-four sought participation at trial. See OTP’s 25 June 2007 DRC Submis-
sion, supra note 134, ¶ 2. 
198 Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr, Corrigendum à la « 
Décision sur les demandes de participation à la procédure déposées dans le cadre 
de l’enquête en République démocratique du Congo par a/0004/06 à a/0009/06, 
a/0016/06 à a/0063/06 a/0071/06 à a/0080/06 et a/0105/06 à a/0110/06, 
a/0188/06, a/0128/06 à a/0162/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06, a/0209/06, a/0214/06, 
a/0220/06 à a/0222/06, a/0224/06, a/0227/06, a/0230/06, a/0234/06 à a/0236/06, 
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filed with the Registry at least eight months prior, and some had 
been filed more than a year and a half before the Chamber issued 
its decision.199  In its December 2007 decision, moreover, the 
Chamber failed to reach any determination on over half of the 140 
applications considered, thus ensuring that many applicants would 
continue to wait further for any disposition.200  Similarly, when in 
August 2007 the Single Judge in the Uganda situation first consid-
ered the first forty-nine applications upon which the parties had 
submitted observations, only seven applications were resolved, and 
forty-two were deferred.201  The forty-two applicants whose re-
quests had been deferred then waited another seven months, until 
March 2008, when the Single Judge issued the next decision re-
considering their applications.202  This second decision resolved 
another thirteen applications, leaving thirty-five applicants, of the 
forty-nine originally in the group, who yet had no decision from 
the Chamber, despite having applied to participate at least one year 
and four months previously.203 
¶63 Notably, the delay just described precedes any attempt to 
carry out the second step of the two-stage analysis adopted by the 
Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers: the assessment of whether the theo-
retical right should be translated to actual participation, based on 
consideration, inter alia, of the potential effects of the proposed 
participation on fairness and efficiency.  The second step, of decid-
ing to permit participation in specific proceedings has, in case pro-
ceedings, been carried out only in connection with the four victims 
who have been participating in the Lubanga case since 2006 and 
another five applicants who in April 2008 obtained the right to par-
ticipate in the second DRC case, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga 
and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui.204  In the ICC investigations, of the 
                                                                                                             
a/0240/06, a/0225/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 à a/0233/06, a/0237/06 à a/0239/06 
et a/0241/06 à a/0250/06 », Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 31, 2008) [herei-
nafter Second Decision re DRC Situation Participation]. The decision was re-
issued by means of the Corrigendum, dated 31 January 2008, which does not 
acknowledge that the original decision was issued on 24 December 2007. 
199 See id. at 3-5. 
200 See id. at 57-59. 
201 See 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, at 2-3, 61-62.  
202 See Second Decision re Uganda Participation, supra note 74. 
203 See id. at 2-3, 70-71. 
204 The other nine victims who obtained the “status of victim” in a case did so in 
the Kony proceeding, in which there has been no arrest.  See supra note iii and 
accompanying text. 
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107 applicants who have obtained a theoretical right to participate, 
the vast majority have never pursued any request to participate in a 
specific proceeding.  Others have participated, thus far, only in the 
proceedings relating to the existence or scope of the right to par-
ticipate.  Only a handful of the 107 “situation victims” have even 
arguably been permitted to participate in any investigation-phase 
proceeding.  As is related infra in Part III.C, six applicants granted 
the “status of victim” in the DRC situation requested further in-
formation about the OTP’s investigative strategy in the DRC, but 
Pre-Trial Chamber I denied the request. 
¶64 The Chambers embraced a system requiring application-by-
application consideration at each of the two stages, with the view 
that the granting of a broad theoretical right could be balanced by a 
separate consideration of the effects of participation.  The opera-
tion of the system, however, seems to be proving that victims will 
continue to fail to obtain actual participation, because both steps of 
the analysis are strongly resistant to completion. 
B. The Proliferation of Litigation Relating to Victims’ 
Participation 
¶65 Contributing to the slow pace at which applications to 
participate have proceeded to actual participation is an entirely 
predictable circumstance: the opening of the door to victim’s par-
ticipation has correspondingly opened an entire area of litigation 
relating to the novel right.  The OTP, defense counsel, and victims’ 
representatives have raised and briefed—and the ICC judges have 
adjudicated—dozens of issues relating to the process of submit-
ting, evaluating, and adjudicating applications to participate.  In 
addition to such fundamental questions as the proper definition of 
“personal interests” in Article 68(3), or the extent of information-
gathering that a Chamber must undertake in determining whether 
to grant an application to participate, this litigation has addressed 
numerous other issues, including: 
 Whether applicants or individuals granted the status 
of victim are entitled to protective measures fur-
nished by the Court;205 
                                                 
205 See, e.g., 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 73 (referencing 
Art. 57(3)(c), which among other things, empowers Pre-Trial Chambers to pro-
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 Which parties, participants, and counsel are entitled 
to know the identities of the applicants, and 
when;206 
 Whether the form distributed by the Registry to ap-
plicants adequately records the circumstances in 
which the application was completed;207 
 The extent of the duties that the Office of Public 
Counsel for Victims (“OPCV”) may perform on be-
half of applicants who have no legal representa-
tive;208 
 The extent to which non-public information and 
evidence should be made available to participating 
victims or applicants to participate;209 
                                                                                                             
vide protective measures to victims and witnesses); OTP’s 28 February 2007 
Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 15; 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, 
supra note 47, ¶¶ 98-99;  Situation in Darfur, Situation No. ICC-02/05-81, Pros-
ecution’s Reply under Rule 89(1) to the Applications for Participation of Appli-
cants a/0011/06, a/0012/06, a/0013/06, a/0014/06 and a/0015/06 in the Situation 
in Darfur, the Sudan, Public, ¶ 27 (June 8, 2007). 
206 See, e.g., Defense 7 August 2006 Lubanga Submission re Leave to Appeal, 
supra note 129, ¶¶ 5-6, 36-47 (seeking leave to appeal practice of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I to provide redacted applications to defense); Situation in the DRC, 
Situation No. ICC-01/04-374, Decision on the Requests of the Legal Represen-
tative of Applicants on Application Process for Victims’ Participation and Legal 
Representation, Public, ¶¶ 16-29 (Aug. 17, 2007) [hereinafter 17 August 2007 
DRC Decision on Application Process] (resolving dispute between OPCV and 
OPCD as to whether OPCD was entitled to unredacted versions of victims’ ap-
plications); Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-209, Deci-
sion on Prosecutor’s “Application to Lift Redactions from Applications for Vic-
tims’ Participation to be Provided to the OTP” and on the Prosecution’s Further 
Submissions Supplementing such Application, and Request for Extension of 
Time, Public, 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, Feb. 20, 2007) (denying OTP’s request to 
be furnished with unredacted versions of applications to participate in situation 
and case).   
207 See, e.g., OPCD DRC Request for Addt’l Information from Applicants, supra 
note 163, ¶¶ 20-21; DRC Decision on OPCD Requests for Addt’l and Exculpa-
tory Information, supra note 166, ¶ 15. 
208 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-243, Deci-
sion on the OPCV’s Observations on Victims’ Applications and on the Prosecu-
tion’s Objections Thereto, Public, 4-6 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, Apr. 16, 2007) 
(dismissing as inadmissible OPCV submission in the case and situation on be-
half of applicants, on ground that it is beyond the OPCV’s mandate of providing 
support and assistant to legal representative of victims). 
209 See, e.g., 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶¶ 74, 76 (stating 
that Chamber will determine on case-by-case basis whether to admit victims to 
proceedings otherwise conducted in closed session; also denying applicants ac-
cess to non-public documents “for the time being”);  OTP’s 28 February 2007 
Uganda Submission, supra note 130, ¶ 18 & n.31 (arguing that expansion of 
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 Whether and at what stage a participating victim 
may remain anonymous without infringing the 
rights of accused persons;210 
 Whether representatives of applicants or victims are 
entitled to remain anonymous;211 
 The extent to which common representatives should 
be appointed for participating victims;212 
 Whether applicants granted the status of victim are 
entitled to a presumption of indigence such that the 
Court should bear the expenses of their representa-
tion.213 
¶66 These issues suggest the dimensions of the burden imposed 
on the participants, the judges, and the Registry.  As to any group 
of applications under consideration, the Chamber must resolve all 
of the preliminary disputes about the application process before it 
may proceed to granting or denying even the “status of victim.” 
Applications are often found to be deficient under the developing 
standards, and thus are deferred, supplemented, and then reconsid-
                                                                                                             
participation rights should not lead to disclosure of investigative activities to 
victims); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
1211, Decision on the Role of the Office of Public Counsel for Victims and Its 
Request for Access to Documents, Public, ¶ 40 (Trial Chamber I, Mar. 6, 2008) 
(declining to permit the OPCV, who represented applicants to participate in the 
case, same access to non-public information as representatives of victims).  
210 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
462, Decision on the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, 
a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the Confirmation Hearing, Public, 5-7 (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I,  Sept. 22, 2006) (determining that victims who obtained right to par-
ticipate in confirmation hearing could only remain anonymous if they did not 
“add any point of fact or evidence at all to the Prosecution’s case-file . . . in the 
notification of charges document and the list of evidence,” and thus that they 
could not question the witnesses); Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, su-
pra note 3, ¶¶ 130-31 (rejecting arguments of defense and the OTP that victims 
should not be permitted to testify anonymously at trial). 
211 See, e.g., 17 August 2007 DRC Decision on Application Process, supra note 
206, ¶¶ 30-31, 45-48. 
212 See, e.g., Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶¶ 123-26. 
213 See Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-494, Demande de réexa-
men de la “Décision du Greffier sur la demande d’aide judiciaire aux frais de la 
Cour déposé par Maître Keta au nom des victimes des victimes a/0016/06, 
a/0018/06, a/0021/06, a/0025/06, a/0028/06, a/0031/06, a/0032/06, a/0034/06, 
a/0042/06, a/0044/06, a/0045/06, a/0142/06, a/0148/06, a/0150/06, a/0188/06, 
a/0199/06, a/0028/06” datée du 28 Mars 2008 selon la norme 85.3 du Règlement 
de la Cour, Public, ¶ 8 (Apr. 14, 2008) (request by legal representative of vic-
tims).  
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ered.  The decisions undertaking to render determinations on the 
“status of victim” are lengthy and onerous to compose, because 
individual consideration of each application is required.  Finally, 
the announcement of any new standard, or submission of supple-
mental information, can itself open other doors to new legal chal-
lenges. 
¶67 The public record of ICC proceedings makes it possible to 
begin to quantify the time and energy expended in administering 
the victim participation system.  Under this author’s count, and 
again as of May 1, 2008, the Chambers have rendered over 100 
decisions relating to the process of obtaining victims’ participation.  
Filings by the participants on the same topic number over 180.214  
The relevant material consists of thousands of pages, and repre-
sented by the material are thousands of man-hours of the work of 
judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and victims’ representatives.  
The Registry additionally bears a considerable burden, because it 
routinely conducts missions to the field to educate potential situa-
tion and case victims, to obtain applications, to gather information 
to include in its reporting under Rule 86(5), and to seek supple-
mentation of applications deemed by the judges to be incomplete.  
The Registry units of the OPCD, OPCV and the Victim Participa-
tion and Reparation Section (“VPRS”), have also been heavily in-
volved in litigation relating to victims’ participation, especially in 
the investigation phase, although the mandate of each unit em-
braces several other duties.215 
                                                 
214 The figures count only public decisions and submissions relating to the proc-
ess of obtaining participation rights.  They exclude submissions by participating 
victims expressing “views and concerns” in specific proceedings, or filings by 
the parties responding to such submissions.  
215 The duties of the OPCD include representing the interests of defendants dur-
ing the initial stages of the investigation, see ICC Regulations, at Reg. 77(4), 
and “provid[ing] support and assistance” to defense counsel, including “legal 
research and assistance” and help in appearing before the Chamber, see id. at 
Reg. 77(5).  The OPCV can be appointed to represent participating victims, see 
id., at Reg. 80(2), but also has duties to “provide support and assistance to the 
legal representative for victims and to victims,” see id. at Reg. 81(4).  The VPRS 
is charged with receiving applications for participation and reparations, helping 
victims to organize their representation, providing the notifications to victims 
which must occur under the RPE, for example, when the Prosecutor determines 
to open an investigation proprio motu, and publicizing the Court’s proceedings, 
including reparations proceedings.  See Participation of victims in proceedings, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/victimsissues/victimsparticipation.html (last visited June 
10, 2008); Reparations for Victims, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/victimsissues/victimsreparation.html (last visited June 10, 2008).  
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¶68 Examination of the litigation related to victims’ participation 
led the WCRO to conclude, in its November 2007 report, that the 
trade-off between effective participation and the efficiency of court 
proceedings was proving to be unfavorable.  It noted that “despite 
the slow process of evaluating victims’ applications and the small 
number of successful applications to date, the ICC victim partici-
pation scheme has consumed a substantial part of the Court’s re-
sources since January 2006.”216  It also concluded that “the de-
tailed, individualized procedure developed by the Court to review 
victims is a drain on the resources of the Prosecutor and Defence . . 
. .”217  Since the issuance of the WCRO Report, trial-phase work 
has also been affected by the resource drain.  The starting date for 
the ICC’s first trial—the Lubanga trial—was postponed from 
March 31, 2008 to June 23, 2008, shortly after Trial Chamber I’s 
February 26, 2008 decision to grant leave to the parties to appeal 
issues relating to victims’ participation at trial.218 
¶69 The question is the extent to which the litigation regarding 
victims’ participation could be mitigated, given the reality that, in a 
court of limited resources, every resource expended to implement 
the victim participation framework is a resource that cannot be 
used to support other court activities.  These alternative activities 
would include, for example, continuing or expanding the number 
of investigations and cases, providing protection for victims and 
witnesses who will appear in court, supplementing the resources of 
defense counsel, or providing hearings and trials more expedi-
tiously.  Some of the expenditure and delay associated with provid-
ing victims’ participation is unavoidable, because incorporating 
meaningful participation into court proceedings necessitates the 
setting of legal standards, outreach efforts, and adjudication of ap-
plications.  Still, the developing record identifies certain circum-
stances that are failing to bring reward, either to victims or the 
Court.  One is the failure of the Chambers and judges to harmonize 
                                                 
216 WCRO Report, supra note 6, at 5. 
217 Id. at 60. 
218 See ICC Press Release, Trial in the Case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Will 
Commence on 23 June 2008 (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/press/pressreleases/348.html; Transcript in Prosecutor v. Thomas Luban-
ga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-75-ENG (Feb. 13, 2008), at 2-4 (ex-
plaining that Trial Chamber I was contemplating delaying trial because of OTP 
delay in completing disclosure and Chamber’s intention to grant leave to appeal 
victims’ participation decision).     
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the governing legal standards.  The preference for innovation, or 
“concessions,” at the expense of pragmatic, non-controversial 
rulemaking, has fostered uncertainty and delay. Years into the 
ICC’s operations, there is a substantial possibility that the Appeals 
Chamber will change, yet again, the standards governing victims’ 
participation. 
¶70 The step of granting hypothetical rights has also diverted 
significant time and energy.  If it typically takes a year or more to 
adjudicate an applicant’s right to participate, it appears particularly 
unproductive for the Chambers to grant hypothetical rights to par-
ticipate in any case in which arrest has yet to be effected.  A logi-
cal priority would be for Pre-Trial Chambers to focus on pre-trial 
issues arising in cases involving defendants in custody, and to ad-
judicate applications to participate in cases only after a defendant 
has come into custody.  The record also indicates that individuals 
granted “the status of victim,” particularly in the investigation, are 
rarely seeking participation in any specific proceeding.219  It might 
better serve the Court, and victims, for Chambers to decline to 
grant any right to participate, in the absence of greater specifica-
tion by the applicant of the proceedings in which he or she wishes 
to participate. 
¶71 All of the time and resources expended to administer the 
general right to participate in the investigation are particularly sus-
ceptible to critical review.  The difficulty of adjudicating the first 
few hundred applications to participate, and the failure of the gen-
eral right to produce actual participation during investigations, 
suggests strongly that it may have been ill-considered for the Court 
to undertake to provide general participation in the investigation 
before settling the practice of administering far less controversial 
participation rights. 
¶72 Moreover, the theoretical right to participate in the investiga-
tion is the right most removed from the core mandate of the Court 
and most likely to raise false expectations among applicants.  In 
over two years, only eighteen applicants have successfully ob-
tained participation in a case, and all eighteen have qualified under 
the rule that such participation requires the applicant to have suf-
fered from a charged crime.220  The figure shows that if the rule 
                                                 
219 See discussion infra in Part III.C. 
220 This is because Trial Chamber I, the Chamber which disagreed with that rule, 
has yet to apply its more generous test for granting the potential right to partici-
pate in a case. 
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requiring the causal link between the charged crime and the harm 
suffered by the victim is upheld on appeal, even victims who suc-
cessfully obtain the status of victim in the investigation are highly 
unlikely to qualify to participate in any ICC case.  Most of the en-
ergy now expended in providing victims’ participation is thus de-
voted to granting a theoretical right to victims of crimes and perpe-
trators who are not, and are likely never to become, the subject of 
any ICC case. 
¶73 As the foregoing suggests, identifying and remedying 
inefficient and unproductive efforts will ultimately better serve vic-
tims in addition to the Court itself.  A resource drain created by the 
victims’ participation framework prejudices victims by delaying 
the meting of justice as well as victims’ participation in the judicial 
process.  It is less acknowledged but equally true that poor admini-
stration of participation rights also constrains the number of vic-
tims who can participate and the extent of their participation. 
C. Victims’ Inability to Obtain Meaningful Participation 
¶74 Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the current victims’ 
participation framework is that the extent of meaningful participa-
tion has been negligible.  The process of granting the participation 
right has been intense and all-consuming, whereas the incorpora-
tion of the substance of victims’ “views and concerns” in underly-
ing ICC proceedings has been meager. 
¶75 It should be clarified at the outset that by “meaningful 
participation” is meant the participation intended in the Statute: the 
actual expression of views and concerns by victims in proceedings 
following the determination that their participation is appropriate.  
The Chambers have thus far purported to be granting nothing less 
than such a “concrete” and “effective” right.221  Victims’ represen-
tatives likewise have not characterized the objective of Article 
68(3) to be the distribution of theoretical or hypothetical rights.  
Rather they have adopted the strategy of pursuing concrete partici-
pation in the broadest range of proceedings222 while articulating, 
                                                 
221 See, e.g., 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 71.  
222 See, e.g. Situation in Uganda, Situation No. ICC-02/04-106, Response of 
Legal Representative of Victims a/0101/06 and a/0119/06 to the “Prosecution’s 
Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims’ Applications for Par-
ticipation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and 
a/0111/06 to a/0127/06,” Public, ¶ 23 (Aug. 31, 2007) (arguing that victims 
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for example, that victims’ “enjoyment of their right to participate 
in the proceedings,” cannot be impaired by “technical difficulties,” 
such as a lack of Court resources.223 
¶76 Some differentiation between the investigation and case 
phases is necessary in evaluating the extent of meaningful victims’ 
participation, so defined.  The general right to participate in the 
investigation phase is failing conspicuously to yield meaningful 
participation.  Of the 107 or so applicants who have succeeded in 
obtaining the procedural status of victim vis-à-vis an investigation, 
only six have made any request related to any investigation, and 
the two applications they submitted were rejected.  The two re-
quests that the Chamber considered were made in the DRC inves-
tigation,224 and concerned an issue which the victims likely viewed 
to be of great importance to their “personal interests”: the scope 
and direction of the OTP’s investigation, following an OTP an-
nouncement, in June 2006, that it had temporarily suspended the 
bringing of additional charges against Lubanga.225  The victims re-
quested that Pre-Trial Chamber I order the OTP to provide more 
information about the DRC investigation, in light of what they 
termed the OTP’s “tacit decision not to prosecute under article 
                                                                                                             
should be permitted to participate in investigation because “their participation 
can serve to clarify the facts and to assist the Court to fight impunity”). 
223 See Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-105-tEN, Observations of 
the Legal Representative of VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 following the Prosecution’s 
Application for Leave to Appeal Pre-Trial Chamber 1’s Decision on the Appli-
cations for Participation in Proceedings of VPRS 1 to VPRS 6, Public, ¶¶ 21-26 
(Jan. 27, 2006).  
224 The two submissions by victims, ICC-01/04-213-Conf-Exp, and ICC-01/04-
214-Conf-Exp, and the OTP responses, remain non-public, but are known from 
the resulting decision.  See Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-399, 
Decision on the Requests of the Legal Representative for Victims VPRS 1 to 
VPRS 6 Regarding “Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation,” Public 
(Sept. 26, 2007) [hereinafter 26 September 2007 DRC Decision on Victims’ 
Applications re Scope of Investigation]. The conclusion that only these two ap-
plications have been made by individuals granted the “status of victim” is neces-
sarily drawn from publicly available documents and filings.  The WCRO Report 
deems as another instance of victims’ participation in a proceeding the submis-
sion of the victims’ representative relating to the OTP’s request to appeal the 
January 17, 2006 decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I.  See WCRO Report, supra 
note 6, at 5.  This request sought the right to participate, however, instead of 
providing “views and concerns” in a substantive proceeding.    
225 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-170, 
Prosecutor’s Information on Further Investigation, Public Formatted and Re-
dacted Document, ¶ 11 (June 28, 2006). 
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53(2)(c).”226  They also requested that the OTP be required to in-
form the Chamber of any information which might bear on the 
need to “preserve evidence” relating to the crimes from which they 
themselves had suffered. 227  After a year passed, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber I issued its ruling.  The Chamber determined, without extended 
discussion, that because the OTP had taken no decision not to in-
vestigate or prosecute, under paragraphs 1(c) or 2(c) of Article 53, 
and because there was no information that the OTP had not pre-
served evidence, the two victims’ applications should be re-
jected.228 
¶77 The account of these requests by the victims is instructive.  
Pre-Trial Chamber I had held out the offer of broad and independ-
ent victims’ participation during the investigation.  When faced 
with applications to obtain actual participation via these two appli-
cations, however, the Chamber in fact limited the victims to ex-
actly the same participation right they would have obtained with-
out the “general” participation right granted in the January 17, 
2006 decision: the express right under Rule 92(2) to submit views 
and concerns about any decision not to prosecute under the terms 
of Article 53(1) or 53(2).229   
¶78 In addition, the nearing of the end of one portion of the DRC 
investigation serves to underscore that granting the “procedural 
status of victim” vis-à-vis an investigation may often frustrate, ra-
ther than serve, victims’ interests.  Earlier this year, the Prosecutor 
suggested that the focus of OTP investigations in the DRC would 
change from the Ituri district in Oriental Province to the provinces 
of North and South Kivu.230  The 340 or so applicants who have 
sought participation in the DRC investigation thus far, and the 
                                                 
226 See 26 September 2007 DRC Decision on Victims’ Applications re Scope of 
Investigation, supra note 224, at 2-3. 
227 See id. 
228 See id. at 5-6. 
229 See RPE, supra note 17, R. 92(2) (providing in relevant part, “In order to 
allow victims to apply for participation in the proceedings in accordance with 
rule 89, the Court shall notify victims concerning the decision of the Prosecutor 
not to initiate an investigation or not to prosecute pursuant to article 53”). 
230  See Associated Press, Congo turns over to international court colonel sus-
pected of war crimes, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 7, 2008, available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/07/europe/EU-GEN-War-Crimes-
Congo.php (“Now the Court is turning its attention to more recent violence in 
the North and South Kivu regions of Congo, where forces loyal to rebel leader 
Laurent Nkunda have been accused of widespread atrocities.”). 
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eighty-odd who ultimately obtained the “status of victim” in that 
investigation, are likely to have sought participation because they 
were victims of crimes committed in Ituri, given the OTP’s early 
announcements of an intent to focus investigative activities 
there,231 and the fact that the first DRC cases involved Ituri armed 
groups.  If the DRC investigation, and proceedings related to that 
investigation, now turn to the Kivus, the opportunities of the indi-
viduals who thus far have applied to participate in the DRC inves-
tigation are ending, without any such applicant having achieved 
meaningful participation.  These applicants also are highly unlikely 
to be afforded the right to participate in the two pending cases re-
lating to Ituri, at least based on previous decisions of the Pre-Trial 
Chambers, unless they are found to be victims specifically of the 
charged crimes. 
¶79 In case proceedings, by contrast, there has been promising, 
influential, and meaningful victim participation.  Again, though, 
the most prominent example was victim participation at the Lu-
banga confirmation hearing, and such participation is uncontrover-
sial under the Statute in any event.  At that hearing, conducted over 
a period of days in November 2006, legal representatives of the 
participating victims expressed “views and concerns”  that were 
uniquely informed by the victims’ experiences and desires.232  The 
interventions were relevant, often eloquent, and did not lend them-
selves to criticism that they impaired either the fairness or the effi-
ciency of the proceedings.233  Over a year after the confirmation 
hearing, however, the same four victims who participated at con-
                                                 
231 See, e.g., ICC Press Release, Communications Received by the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the ICC, No. pids.009.2003-EN, at 2-3 (July 16, 2003) (announc-
ing OTP intention to follow closely the situation in Ituri), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/press/mediaalert/16_july__english.pdf. 
232 See Transcripts of Confirmation Hearing in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Case Nos. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-30-EN (Nov. 9, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-
T-32-EN (Nov. 10, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-33-EN (Nov. 13, 2006), ICC-
01/04-01/06-T-34-EN (Nov. 14, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-37-EN (Nov. 15, 
2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-38-EN (Nov. 20, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-39-EN 
(Nov. 21, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-41-EN (Nov. 22, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-
T-43-EN (Nov. 23, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-44-EN (Nov. 24, 2006), ICC-
01/04-01/06-T-45-EN (Nov. 27, 2006), ICC-01/04-01/06-T-47-EN (Nov. 28, 
2006). 
233 See id.  The opening arguments of victims’ representatives can be found at 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-30-EN (Nov. 9, 2006), at pp. 75-102, and their 
closing arguments at Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-47-EN (Nov. 28, 2006), at 
pp. 45-86. 
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firmation remain the only ones who have qualified to participate in 
the Lubanga case, despite the pendency of hundreds of applica-
tions.  These four are in the position of representing thousands or 
tens of thousands of children or family members who suffered 
harm from the alleged crime perpetrated by Lubanga: helping to 
implement a policy of conscription and enlisting children into his 
militia group and using them in hostilities.  They have not, how-
ever, been determined to be representative. They simply are the 
few who have been fortunate enough to have had their applications 
considered and ruled upon. 
¶80 In addition, if the ruling of Trial Chamber I stands on appeal, 
participation at the pre-trial and trial phases is likely to become 
much more burdensome for victims to obtain.  Applicants who 
have participated in pre-trial proceedings in the Lubanga case have 
qualified under the bright-line rule of having suffered from the 
specific crimes charged in the case.  The January 18, 2008 ruling 
of Trial Chamber I, by contrast, would create a large class of theo-
retical participants—individuals who have been the victim of any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court—but require each of 
those victims to demonstrate additionally that he or she holds in-
formation relevant to the issues and evidence being considered.  
The inquiry will again be fact-intensive, and experience suggests 
that timely adjudications are unlikely. 
¶81 Rulings of the Chamber that expanded theoretical rights 
were met with wide approval, especially by victims, but the vast 
majority of applicants are overwhelmingly likely never to partici-
pate in specific proceedings.  Representatives of victims have be-
gun complaining about how difficult it has been to obtain victims’ 
participation and have acknowledged the challenge of maintaining 
realistic expectations among clients who can easily and mistakenly 
believe that an application to participate will lead inexorably to a 
“day in court” and reparations.234  The challenge for the ICC is to 
enhance real prospects for meaningful victims’ participation and to 
                                                 
234 See, e.g., VRWG Article re Darfur Applicants, supra note 7 (quoting legal 
representatives of applicants in the Darfur situation: “We were surprised at how 
difficult it turned out to be from a practical point of view “ and “the delay [in 
obtaining decisions on the applications] is difficult to explain to our clients”); 
IWPR Report, supra note 7 (reporting views of lawyers at Avocats Sans Fron-
tières and REDRESS, and legal representatives of applicants in Darfur situation, 
that applicants do not receive adequate legal aid from the ICC; ICC reported to 
have stated that the 735,000 euro in the ICC budget available for legal aid for 
victims would go to victims approved for participation). 
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clarify standards to eliminate false expectations that can, over the 
long-term, undermine the credibility of the Court and dishonor the 
dignity of victims. 
IV. SOURCES OF THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE GREATER MEANINGFUL 
PARTICIPATION 
¶82 Several broad causes of the ICC’s lack of success in 
developing viable victims’ participation standards have particular 
relevance to attempts to formulate strategies for strengthening the 
participation framework. 
A. Departure from the Balances Struck in the Rome Statute 
¶83 One factor that has contributed prominently to the deficien-
cies in the victim participation system has been the repeated disre-
gard of fundamental balances struck during the negotiation of the 
Rome Statute.  The decisions of the Chambers on the topic of vic-
tims’ participation have aspired to innovate; each Chamber and 
Judge has eschewed limits in favor of granting more and more ex-
pansive forms of participation (in some cases, more expansive than 
any participant had sought).  The common shortcoming is the fail-
ure to acknowledge that the drafters of the Rome Statute fully con-
sidered the extent of victims’ participation and set limitations to 
participation.   
¶84 The first example of overreaching was the decision to create 
a general right to participate in the investigation.  The reasoning of 
the January 17, 2006 decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I rebuffed the 
proposition that formed the foundation for discussions at Rome: 
that the rights of defendants and participation by victims must be 
regarded as inherently in conflict.  Thus Pre-Trial Chamber I 
opined (and predicted) that it could expand victims’ participation 
in investigations, while regulating, through later decisions, the ad-
verse affects on defense rights.  The passage of time has shown the 
self-confidence of the Chamber to be less astute than the restraint 
of the negotiators of the Rome Statute.  Neither the Chambers, nor 
victims, have identified any investigation-phase proceeding in 
which victim participation can profitably occur, beyond the in-
stances already expressly identified in the Statute.  The Lubanga 
defense, in the meantime, has compiled a record of the ways in 
which the Chambers’ consideration of accounts of victimization 
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may have prejudiced the defense or adversely affected the Cham-
bers’ appearance of impartiality. 
¶85 Instead of recognizing the necessity of limits, the methodol-
ogy has been to justify each expansion of the participation right by 
invoking recent, and significant, developments in a growing 
movement to enhance the rights and entitlements of crime victims.  
The Chambers have drawn support from both human rights juris-
prudence and U.N. declarations.  The January 17, 2006 Decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, for example, relied on rulings from the Euro-
pean and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights in making its 
central determination: that the objective or purpose pursued by 
those Courts, of granting victims “an independent voice and role,” 
justified conferring a general right to participate in an ICC investi-
gation, even if the text of the Statute did not mandate that right.235  
Trial Chamber I, two years later, used similar analysis in reasoning 
that the Basic Victims Principles adopted by the U.N. General As-
sembly, which expressly declined to condition one’s status as a 
“victim” upon any apprehension of a perpetrator, dictated that the 
ICC should use the same definition.236 
¶86 Both of these decisions wrongly departed from the outcomes 
at Rome.  The drafters were equally aware of the advances in hu-
man rights law in favor of granting “an independent voice” to vic-
tims, and of promoting the rights and entitlements of victims.237  
                                                 
235 See 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶¶ 50-54 (section entitled 
“the teleological argument”).  The Single Judge of the Uganda situation adopted 
this reasoning. See 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, ¶ 7. 
236 See Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶¶ 35, 92. 
237 See WCRO Report, supra note 6, at 8 (“The unprecedented provisions for 
victim participation in the proceedings of the International Criminal Court are 
largely a product of a much broader movement in recent decades towards the 
achievement of restorative–as opposed to strictly retributive–justice”) & 10 
(“the drafters of the ICC Rome Statute were particularly influenced by United 
Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims and Crime and 
Abuse of Power” which was “the first formal recognition at the international 
level that victims are entitled ‘access to the mechanisms of justice and to prompt 
redress, as provided for by national legislation, for the harm they have suf-
fered’”) (quoting United National Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. GAOR, 40th 
Sess., 96th plenary mtg, Annex, U.N Doc. A/RES/40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985)); 
Fernández de Gurmendi, supra note 12, at 428-31 (describing that the broad 
definition of victims in the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims and Crime and Abuse of Power was advocated before Rome 
and by many delegations at Rome, but that ultimately the idea of incorporating a 
definition of victims from the Declaration, or from any other source, was aban-
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They, too, sought to promote and lend further momentum to that 
movement, and the consequence was a Statute that granted to vic-
tims a role representing a high-water mark in victims’ participation 
in international criminal law.  Still, the negotiators at Rome also 
clearly rejected the notion that the goal or trend of giving victims a 
“voice” could justify ever-expanding participation in ICC proceed-
ings.  The objective of providing participation, it was decided, 
would not confer the status of a party, for example, nor would it 
permit more than the expression of “views and concerns,” indi-
rectly through legal representatives.  Boundaries were imposed be-
cause of the specific considerations that apply to an international 
criminal court: the need to balance the interests of the defense with 
the Court’s ability to prosecute efficiently those responsible for the 
most serious crimes in the world. 
¶87 The weakness in the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I thus 
was disregard of the fact that the Statute already answers the im-
portant questions of how much of an independent voice and role 
the victims were to obtain, and in what ways victims will be en-
abled to participate in the fight against impunity.  Any ellipsis in 
the Statute about any general right to participate in the investiga-
tion, or any other instance or form of participation, should not be 
regarded as a negative space into which additional participation 
rights should be granted.  Rather, and especially in light of the oth-
er distinctions the negotiators plainly made, it should be respected 
that the incremental participation was disfavored because of the 
consequences for fairness and efficiency. 
¶88 Trial Chamber I’s decision that an applicant could obtain the 
potential right to participate at trial, regardless of whether he or she 
suffered harm from any crime being prosecuted by the ICC, like-
wise disregarded a fundamental limit: the jurisdiction of the Court.  
The dissent of Judge Blattman correctly pointed out that, in any 
court, the implicit limitation of the court’s jurisdiction or compe-
tence must inform the extent of a participation right.  For Trial 
Chamber I to permit participation in a trial by victims of crimes 
other than the only crimes being tried, in essence, arrogated power 
to the Chamber that it does not possess.  No court, domestic or in-
ternational, has even attempted such an expansion of its own au-
thority.  The majority opinion’s reliance on the Basic Victims 
Principles is infirm, in addition, because the majority either ig-
                                                                                                             
doned because the definition was too controversial).  
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nored, or failed to appreciate, that the Principles have been adopted 
for a critical but different purpose: to express the obligation and 
agreement of states to provide redress to all victims of violations 
of international humanitarian and human rights law, regardless of 
whether perpetrators are identified or punished.  The ICC is not a 
state, and it has no such broad obligation, nor the capability to ful-
fill it.  As the OPCD has argued in the pending appeals in the DRC 
and Darfur situations: the Court “has neither the obligation nor the 
power to give effect to the right to a remedy for every potential 
victim” of all crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.238 
¶89 Finally, in certain instances the Chambers have chosen a 
balance that appears to have been affirmatively rejected in the 
Court’s governing documents.  The Statute and the RPE, for ex-
ample, clearly disapprove granting victims the right to adduce evi-
dence at trial.  Those documents declined to give victims the status 
of “party” and prohibit victims from even posing questions to wit-
nesses at hearings and trial, absent prior court approval.  The nego-
tiators at Rome rejected proposed text granting victims the right to 
present evidence.239  Against this background, for Trial Chamber I 
                                                 
238 See 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶ 52; Situation 
in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-440, OPCD Appeal Brief on the “Decision 
on the Requests of the OPCD on the Production of Relevant Supporting Docu-
mentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the Regulations of the Court and 
on the Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials by the Prosecutor,” Public, ¶ 53 
(Feb. 4, 2008).   
239 Compare U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an Int’l Crim. Ct., Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
Int’l Crim. Ct., Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, at 109, A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998) 
(proposing Art. 68(8) that provided victims’ representatives with a “right to par-
ticipate in the proceedings with a view to presenting additional evidence needed 
to establish the basis of criminal responsibility as a foundation for their right to 
pursue civil compensation”), and Proposal Submitted by Canada, at 2, 
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L 58 (July 6, 1998) (proposing during Rome negotia-
tions, and as part of an Art. 68(3), the same language contained in the Prepara-
tory Commission draft), with U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an Int’l Crim. Ct., Comm. of the Whole, Working 
Group on Procedural Matters, Report of the Working Group on Procedural Mat-
ters, at 4, A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2/ADD.6 (July 11, 1998) (proposing de-
letion of Art. 68(8) of the version of the Statute authored by the Preparatory 
Commission); see also Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 9, at 1406 (“a victim 
does not enjoy the same rights as other parties to the proceedings.  He may not 
participate in the investigation undertaken by the Prosecutor, have access to evi-
dence gathered by the parties, nor call witnesses to testify at the hearing”).  
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to grant victims the right to lead evidence not only upsets statutory 
balances, but risks fostering disrespect of the Statute. 
¶90 The additional irony of this aspect of Trial Chamber I’s 
decision in the Lubanga case is that it affirmatively undermines the 
interests of victims.  The negotiators at Rome, in granting the right 
of victims’ participation, aimed to promote the understanding that 
victims have a role in proceedings in their own right, beyond serv-
ing as witnesses.240  The decision of Trial Chamber I directly re-
turns victims to the limited function of furnishing evidence.  Even 
worse, and as Judge Blattman also suggested, because the decision 
has granted victim status to anyone who suffered harm as a conse-
quence of any crime within the Court’s jurisdiction, the victims of 
the crimes at issue in the trial are effectively discriminated against, 
even in seeking to obtain the limited role of a provider of evidence. 
¶91 Favoring the importation of innovations in human rights law 
over application of the Statute has not paid rewards.  Perhaps most 
troubling is the implicit judgment in the ICC’s judicial decisions 
that the drafters of the Statute must have failed to regard victims’ 
rights, and the means of vindicating those rights, with sufficient 
seriousness or foresight. 
B. Insufficient Regard for Fairness Considerations 
¶92 Balances struck in the Rome Statute are inevitably redrawn if 
victim participation rights are expanded: balances between the 
Prosecutor’s right to independence and the victims’ entitlement to 
pursue redress, for example, or between the need to maintain con-
fidentiality of investigative information and to provide victims 
with knowledge that might enhance participation.  The balance 
which is of paramount importance to maintain, however, is the one 
between the rights of the accused and the rights of victims.  Article 
68(3) could not be clearer in repeating and endorsing the basic pre-
cept that when victims’ participation is “inconsistent with” the 
rights of the accused, victim participation must yield.241 
                                                 
240 Fernández de Gurmendi, supra note 12, at 429 (debate at Rome was about 
“the role of victims—beyond their auxiliary function as witnesses”); WCRO 
Report, supra note 6, at 17 (“the ability of victims to participate before the ICC 
independently of providing witness testimony is a key contribution of the Rome 
Statute in the effort to recognize and respond to victims’ interests in the work of 
the Court”). 
241 Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 68(3) (stating that participation can only take 
place “at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court 
2008]                                                   CHRISTINE H. CHUNG                                                                  
        
519
¶93 The decisions of the Chambers regarding victim participation 
have failed seriously to abide this directive to safeguard defense 
rights.  The Chambers have embraced the notion that fairness to 
the defense should be considered only when the victim seeks to 
participate in a specific proceeding, based on reasoning that con-
ferring the “status of victim” does not per se prejudice defense in-
terests.  This methodology is infirm.  There is no logical basis for 
concluding that the Chambers can excuse themselves from consid-
ering whether prejudicial effects flow from the initial determina-
tion of whether to grant the “status of victim.”  If granting the 
“status of victim,” in itself, cannot be squared with providing a fair 
proceeding, due process or fairness principles, as well as the terms 
of Article 68(3), prohibit even the conferring of the theoretical 
right. 
¶94 In addition, it is becoming clear that creating the “procedural 
status of victim” does concretely and unduly prejudice the defense.  
Merely the resource diversion and delay in proceedings occasioned 
by the adjudication of theoretical rights to participate has already 
had significant effects on the content and pace of the Lubanga pro-
ceedings.  Lubanga’s defense team has also posed, for example, 
the fair question of how a Chamber can render rulings that crimes 
within the Court’s jurisdiction are likely to have been committed, 
based almost exclusively on first-hand accounts by victims, rather 
than on evidence presented by the Prosecution and subject to dis-
closure obligations, without creating an appearance of bias against 
the defense.  Strangely, the Pre-Trial Chambers appear not to have 
foreseen that such issues would arise, and the Appeals Chamber 
now is left with the consequences. 
¶95 The more recent decision of Trial Chamber I implicates the 
rights of the accused even more dramatically, and again impairs 
the predictability and efficiency of Court proceedings.  If accused 
persons can be confronted, at trial, not only by victims of the 
crimes with which he or she is accused, but by victims of any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, the burden on the de-
fense, and the prejudice to it, is patently heightened.242  Selecting 
                                                                                                             
and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the 
accused and a fair and impartial trial”). 
242 There is no assumption that victims uniformly will give evidence tending to 
incriminate the defense.  Rather, the fact that the defense must prepare to meet 
additional evidence, presented by victims, with the risk that the evidence may be 
prejudicial, burdens defense rights.   
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victims for trial participation based largely on whether the appli-
cant has the ability to enhance the trial evidence and trial issues 
will fundamentally alter the relationship between victims and the 
defense and also risks lifting the burden of proof from the Prosecu-
tion.243 
¶96 It can be argued that the Court, in the end, has created a 
balance that does nothing to offend defense rights; that is certainly 
the view of the Chambers whose decisions are now on review.  It is 
nonetheless unsettling that the Court, in connection with its first 
cases, has been so willing to create genuine questions about 
whether it will be compromising due process rights of the defense 
to provide incremental benefits to victims.  The courting of risk 
seems particularly ill-advised given that the Court would achieve 
unprecedented success in vindicating victims’ rights if it granted 
meaningful participation in the proceedings and by modalities that 
are uncontroverted under the Rome Statute.  Will the Court, or 
States or the public, be satisfied that justice is served by a first 
conviction obtained in a manner not so far countenanced in any 
domestic or international court system: through testimony, in part 
or in whole, offered by victims of crimes not allegedly committed 
by the defendant, not proffered by the Prosecution, and not subject 
to any disclosure requirements?  The Court’s repeated invocation 
of the Basic Principles, in effect, without any balancing considera-
tion of human rights declarations establishing the rights of the ac-
cused, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,244 or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,245 is a 
telling circumstance. 
                                                 
243 In addition, the system envisioned by the majority opinion, as Judge Blatt-
man took pains to point out, imposes significant additional burdens: on victims 
to submit two applications to obtain potential and actual participation, on the 
Chambers to assess both potential participation and the value of the victims’ 
information in the context of an evolving record, and on the parties to respond to 
the applications to participate as well as the content of the evidence adduced by 
victims. 
244 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 14(1) (1966) (recognizing right 
of all criminal defendants to a “fair and public hearing by a competent, inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal”).  
245 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, arts. 10 & 11(1) (Dec. 10, 1948) (declaring that 
criminal defendants have entitlement to a “fair and public hearing by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal” and presumption of innocence). 
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C. Over-Estimation of Ability to Manage and Resolve 
Applications to Participate 
¶97 An additional problem in the Chambers’ approach to victim 
participation has been over-confidence in their ability to resolve 
applications to participate and provide actual participation. 
¶98 The most basic misstep was the decision to establish a two-
stage process by which, with respect to each and every application, 
the status of victim is assessed and then the eligibility to participate 
in a specific proceeding determined.  The parties have advanced 
reasons why this two-part, case-by-case analysis, and particularly 
the conferring of a “status of victim,” is not lawful.246  Equally 
worthy of consideration is the gross inefficiency.  The problem in 
the first step is almost self-describing: what is the worth of evaluat-
ing hundreds, potentially thousands, of applications to participate 
for the purpose of granting a theoretical right to participate in court 
proceedings?  In addition, because the “status of victim” is avail-
able to any applicant who can advance some credible claim that he 
or she has suffered harm as a result of any crime within the Court’s 
jurisdiction, the step in practice culls only the procedurally defi-
cient applications. 
¶99 To date, the Chambers have indeed deferred all analytically 
difficult determinations to the second step, a step which has been 
completed only rarely.  In the investigation stage, for example, in 
theory the Pre-Trial Chambers would be considering the effects of 
participation on fairness and efficiency, at a minimum, with re-
spect to applications to participate in specific proceedings.  In ad-
vance of the trial of Lubanga, under Trial Chamber I’s ruling, the 
Chamber would be determining whether any of the (currently) 
hundreds of applicants to participate in the trial have information 
relevant to the issues to be considered at trial, in addition to such 
issues as whether disclosure obligations apply to victims.  The 
burdens imposed by the framework are manifest.  Certainly, the 
operation of the system suggests that if it is ever truly tested—
meaning either that applicants begin seeking participation in sub-
stantially higher numbers or that those who have obtained the pro-
                                                 
246 See supra note 173 and accompanying text; see also Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. 01/04-01/06-1219, Prosecution’s Document in Sup-
port of Appeal Against Trial Chamber I’s 18 January 2008 Decision on Victims’ 
Participation, Public, ¶ 23 (Mar. 10, 2008).  
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cedural status of victim begin routinely seeking to participate in 
specific proceedings—the system may simply break down. 
¶100 The inclination to add unproductive components to legal 
tests, to defer important or difficult analysis, and to underestimate 
the time and effort required to apply the legal standards features 
too prominently in the ICC’s record on victims’ participation.  The 
results for victims, as noted in the WCRO report, include: a lack of 
progress in granting actual rights to participate,247 “frustration 
among applicants,” and “the risk of inconsistent treatment for simi-
larly-situated victims.”248  The WCRO has gone so far as to suggest 
that the “onerous application process” and the “lack of clarity sur-
rounding the victim participation scheme” may explain why “the 
ICC has seen a far smaller-than-anticipated number of applicants 
overall.”249 
D. Failure to Prioritize Core Objectives 
¶101 Finally, the failure of the ICC to set priorities relating to 
victims’ participation with strict reference to its mandate of prose-
cuting “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community,”250 has worked to the detriment of the efficient pro-
ceedings and meaningful victims’ participation.  The ICC is under 
tremendous pressure to demonstrate that the world’s first perma-
nent international criminal court can deliver international justice 
fairly and with efficiency and impact.  The element missing from 
the record of the Court’s operations is a sense that the Chambers 
are holding paramount the implementation of the instances and 
forms of victims’ participation most closely connected to the core 
business of the Court, the rendering of determinations of guilt and 
innocence.  Instead, the Court’s decisions have tended to regard 
participation as an end in itself, or to define the objective of par-
ticipation so abstractly that all participation appears equally desir-
able. 
¶102 The Statute and the RPE clearly focus victims’ participation 
at the specific junctures in ICC proceedings critical to the mission 
of bringing accountability to perpetrators of mass crimes.  The 
Statute and RPE provide that victims should participate when key 
                                                 
247 WCRO Report, supra note 6, at 5. 
248 See id. at 6. 
249 See id. at 56. 
250 Rome Statute, supra note 9, Preamble. 
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determinations altering the course of an investigation or case will 
be made, and the issues or interests relevant to victims are suffi-
ciently crystallized that the expression of “views and concerns” 
will have high value, without risking disruption of the parties’ 
roles and responsibilities, or the efficiency of the Court.  The Stat-
ute and the RPE specify as the moments at which victims should 
participate: any decision by the Prosecutor to start an investigation 
on his own initiative, any admissibility challenge by a State or de-
fendant, the holding of confirmation hearings and trials, and pro-
ceedings regarding reparations. 
¶103 It dramatically alters this system to grant participation rights 
based on a rationale as unbounded as allowing victims to partici-
pate to help “clarify the facts” or “punish the perpetrators of 
crimes.”251  Inherent in the Statute, as well as the jurisdiction of 
any court, is the notion that not every fact will help bring the 
court’s cases to judgment, and not every perpetrator will come be-
fore the court, particularly if the court has a limited mandate. 
¶104 Victims have been disserved by the Court’s foray into testing 
the boundaries of victims’ participation.  Although the Chambers 
have immersed themselves in participation-related adjudications, 
their approach is willy-nilly; there is no collective effort to focus 
on decision-making which has the best chance of yielding mean-
ingful participation.  For example, applicants to participate in the 
Lubanga trial have waited in a queue, some now for years, while 
the Chamber managing the Uganda situation has been rendering 
participation determinations in a case in which no defendant has 
been arrested.  The energy devoted to sorting theoretical rights to 
participate in the DRC investigation has outstripped the effort to 
qualify more than a handful of victims each to participate in the 
Lubanga trial and in pre-trial proceedings relating to defendants 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui. 
¶105 Finally, the tendency to disregard the link between the extent 
and forms of victims’ participation and the Court’s mandate inevi-
tably risks improperly expanding the mandate.  Granting applicants 
a general right to participate during the investigation phase, for ex-
ample, cannot help but convert the Court into a forum for general 
conflict-related advocacy, as Lubanga’s lawyers have pointed out.   
It can easily be considered improper, and unproductive, for the 
ICC to be inviting, considering, and opining about issues such as 
                                                 
251 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 63. 
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whether individuals have been victims of crimes within the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, when there is no likelihood that the applicants’ allega-
tions will fall within the scope of any case commenced at the ICC. 
¶106 The Court’s victim protection responsibilities have also been 
expanded in a dramatic and troubling fashion.  Because the Rome 
Statute imposes an affirmative obligation on the Chambers to pro-
tect “victims” and “witnesses,”252 every expansion of the term “vic-
tim” brings with it the potential obligation to protect additional in-
dividuals and populations.  The judges have indeed expressly em-
braced a responsibility to protect those granted the “status of vic-
tim,”253 and, in the case of the majority opinion of Trial Chamber I, 
to protect even individuals who have only applied to obtain that 
status.254  At the same time, the Court is struggling with the issue 
of whether it has the capacity to protect individuals the parties pro-
pose to call as witnesses in ICC proceedings.255  The issue becomes 
one of whether the ICC’s obligation of protection should be fo-
cused on individuals linked to ICC proceedings, or should be ex-
panded to approximate the security responsibilities of a state or aid 
organization vis-à-vis populations threatened by conflict. 
¶107 In the future, it may develop that participation rights can be 
expanded further as experience is gained in the Court.  The Court’s 
short history, however, strongly suggests that in the near term, par-
                                                 
252 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 57(3)(c). 
253 See, e.g., 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 73 (providing that 
Chamber may decide to permit persons “having the status of victims” in the in-
vestigation to participate in proceedings it initiates under Art. 57(3)(c), which 
provides in pertinent part that the Chamber may “provide for the protection and 
privacy of victims”); 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, ¶¶ 98-99 
(“victims in the context of a situation should be allowed to submit requests 
aimed at obtaining the adoption of such measures [i.e., protective measures] by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber”). 
254 See Decision on Lubanga Trial Participation, supra note 3, ¶¶ 136-37 (pro-
viding that while Chamber “readily understands that considerable demands are 
made on the Victims and Witnesses Unit and there are undoubted limitations on 
the extent of the protective measures that can be provided,” applicants are enti-
tled to protection at “the point at which the application form is received by the 
Court,” since filing an application to participate constitutes “appearing before 
the Court” within the meaning of art. 43(6) of the Rome Statute).  
255 See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07-428-Corr, Corrigendum to the Decision on the Evidentiary 
Scope of the Confirmation Hearing, Preventive Relocation and Disclosure under 
Article 67(2) of the Statute and Rule 77 of the Rules, Public Redacted Version, 
¶¶ 55-63 (Apr. 25, 2008) (determining that it is not sustainable for the ICC to 
provide protection to all witnesses deemed by the OTP to be in need and thus 
that the OTP must rely on fewer witnesses).  
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ticipation in ICC proceedings might best be promoted by prioritiz-
ing some forms of participation over others, consistent with the 
Statute itself.  The experience of the first years of the ICC has 
served to underscore that it is simply not feasible, productive, or 
equitable to equate a “victim” of a conflict to a “victim” entitled to 
ICC participation. 
V. PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING THE VICTIM PARTICIPATION 
SCHEME 
¶108 The matter that the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers have 
largely avoided discussing—the record of the operation of the vic-
tims’ participation framework—must be considered in formulating 
a response to the question currently on appeal, asking how applica-
tions to participate “must be dealt with.” 
¶109 Whether the Appeals Chamber is willing or able, in the 
appeals currently being heard, to harmonize the law so that a more 
rational and effective system of victim participation results, cannot 
be known.  On the one hand, Appeals Chamber review cannot help 
but set some more unified course, as the appealed questions relate 
to both investigations and cases and will apply to all lower Cham-
bers.  The Appeals Chamber also has the benefit of having seen the 
operation of the victim participation system and the successive de-
cisions of the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers.  Still, the Appeals 
Chamber faces some difficult circumstances.  The issues on appeal 
are undeniably difficult, and none of the lower Chambers made an 
effort to engage or discuss opposing or differing rulings.  If the 
Appeals Chamber were inclined to define the victim participation 
right to be any more limited than the lower Chambers, it would 
confront the hardship of disappointing expectations built up by the 
earlier decisions.  Finally, in its prior decisions in interlocutory ap-
peals, the Appeals Chamber has failed to reach unanimity with 
some frequency,256 a circumstance which raises the possibility that 
                                                 
256 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
824 OA7, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sang-Hyun Song Regarding the Partici-
pation of Victims, Public, 55 (Appeals Chamber, Feb. 13, 2007) (dissenting 
from denial of right of victims to participate in appeal from decision declining to 
release Lubanga from custody, and advocating rule that once victims participate 
in lower chamber on a matter, their participation should automatically continue 
on appeal); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
766 OA7, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pikis to the Order of the Appeals Cham-
ber Issued on 4 December 2006, Public (Appeals Chamber, Dec. 11, 2006) (dis-
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the Chamber may not be able to express the degree of consensus or 
certainty which will bring clarity to victims or the proceedings. 
¶110 The following consist of measures for consideration over the 
short or long term, based on the record of the functioning of the 
victims’ participation system in the past years. 
A. Disallow Participation in the Investigation Stage Based Solely 
on a General Interest in Investigation 
¶111 Both the OTP and the OPCD have argued on appeal that the 
requirement of an effect on personal interests, pursuant to Article 
68(3), cannot be met by an interest so broad and common to all 
victims as a general interest in ICC investigations, without render-
ing Article 68(3) meaningless.257  The alternate way of expressing 
the parties’ common position is that there can be no conferring of a 
“procedural status of victim”: that status is nowhere recognized 
under the Statute or the RPE and it was an error to create such a 
status based on a general interest in investigation.258  Before the 
Appeals Chamber, the OPCD has contended that the prejudice to 
the defense which results from the Chamber considering applica-
tions to participate, and rendering decisions about the existence of 
crimes and victims, without first being provided with the evidence 
and information resulting from the OTP’s investigation, means that 
no participation should be permitted before the OTP seeks and ob-
tains warrants of arrest.259 
¶112 The Prosecution has contended that the defense position is 
not entirely correct, because certain forms of participation are ex-
                                                                                                             
senting from order permitting out-of-time filing by victims on the ground that 
the order wrongly avoided answering the question of whether victims could par-
ticipate in the appeal as of right); Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-
01/04-450, Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the OPCV’s Request for Clari-
fication and the Legal Representatives’ Request for Extension of Time and Or-
der of the Appeals Chamber on the Date of Filing of Applications for Participa-
tion and on the Time of the Filing of the Responses thereto by the OPCD and the 
Prosecutor, Public (Feb. 13, 2008) (denying request for clarification from OPCD 
and request for extension of time filed by legal representatives of victims, noting 
that Judge Song dissented, and stating that the reasons for the order and dissent 
would follow). 
257 See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text. 
258 Id.  
259 See, e.g., 4 Feb. 2008 OPCD Darfur Appeal Brief, supra note 149, ¶¶ 39-47 
(contending that until Prosecutor puts forth evidence and case is commenced, 
factual findings regarding the existence of crimes, harms resulting therefrom, 
and potential perpetrators unduly prejudice defense).  
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pressly provided in the Statute during the investigation phase (i.e., 
in the case of admissibility challenges, or if the Prosecutor pro-
poses to commence a proprio motu investigation, or closes an in-
vestigation based on interests-of-justice considerations).260  The 
OTP proposes that the right to participate in the investigation, 
however, must be limited by permitting participation beyond these 
instances only when the applicant demonstrates that his or her per-
sonal interests will be affected by the proceeding at issue, and not 
by the entire phase of investigation.261  In other words, there should 
be no first stage in which any applicant is pre-qualified for a hypo-
thetical right.262  Rather, the Chamber must consider and admit or 
deny participation with respect to particular investigation phase 
proceedings.263 
¶113 The reform strongly suggested by the functioning of the 
victims’ participation system since 2006 is adoption of the rule 
urged by the OTP in earlier proceedings: to revoke entirely the 
general right to participate in the investigation and thus to limit 
participation to the investigation-phase proceedings expressly iden-
tified in the Statute and the RPE.  Pre-Trial Chamber I itself denied 
that the general right was required by the Statutory text, and as dis-
cussed above, in Part IV.A, the Statute cannot properly be inter-
preted to follow, without limits, the movement or trend in human 
rights law to promote the role of victims.  Perhaps equally relevant 
is the fact that since the general right to participate in the investiga-
tion was granted, over two years ago, no exercise of that right has 
                                                 
260 See, e.g., Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Situation No. ICC-02/05-123, Prosecu-
tion’s Response to OPCD’s Appeal Brief on the “Decision on the Requests of 
the OPCD on the Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to 
Regulation 86(2)(e) of the Regulations of the Court and on the and [sic] Disclo-
sure of Potentially Exculpatory Material,” Public, ¶ 25 (Feb. 15, 2008) [herein-
after 15 Feb. 2008 OTP Response to OPCD’s Appeal of Supporting Documenta-
tion Decision]. 
261 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 15-17.  This position is more expansive than the OTP’s stance 
in early proceedings, in which the OTP contended that no investigation-phase 
proceedings, other than the ones expressly identified in the Statute, were appro-
priate for victims’ participation. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
262 See, e.g., 15 Feb. 2008 OTP Response to OPCD’s Appeal of Supporting Do-
cumentation Decision, supra note 260, ¶¶ 15-18 (agreeing with defense position 
that grant of victim status without any finding other than that applicant is af-
fected by the investigation is contrary to the Statute). 
263 See id. ¶ 18.  In the view of the OTP, this reform is required by Rule 89(1), at 
a minimum, because that rule requires a Chamber, when deciding to accept or 
reject an application for participation, to simultaneously “specify the proceed-
ings and manner in which participation is considered appropriate . . . .”  See id.  
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changed any part of any investigation at the ICC.  Instead the con-
sequence has been the significant burdening of Court proceedings 
and of the victims’ opportunities to obtain more meaningful forms 
of participation. 
¶114 Returning to providing only the forms of investigation-phase 
participation expressly envisioned in the Statute would affirm that 
the drafters defined a limit in choosing specific junctures during 
investigation at which victims should be permitted to participate.  
The proposed reform would also have the benefit of re-focusing 
victims’ participation on case proceedings, the main business of 
the Court.  In the investigation, victims would continue to partici-
pate in the proceedings prejudged by the Statute and the RPE to be 
the ones in which their personal interests are implicated.  The 
Court would avoid, however, raising expectations among the mil-
lions of conflict-victims that the Court will hear individual requests 
to have certain crimes or perpetrators investigated, to obtain pro-
tection from the Court, or to have evidence pertaining to each vic-
tim, crime, or perpetrator preserved or collected. 
¶115 Like denying the general right to participate in the investiga-
tion altogether, the OTP-advocated measure of compelling a one-
stage review, such that applicants to participate must establish an 
effect on personal interests in some specific investigation-phase 
proceeding, would eliminate the unproductive task of adjudicating 
the “procedural status of victim” or theoretical rights to participate 
in the investigation.  Under either proposal, the Court would regain 
the thousands of hours which have been spent on the metaphysical 
task of assessing and granting purely theoretical rights to partici-
pate in the investigation. 
¶116 The shortcoming of the OTP’s recommendation is that it 
preserves too much of the open-endedness of the general right.  
The OTP’s current proposal appears to envision that applicants 
might identify, as investigation-phase proceedings in which par-
ticipation is appropriate, proceedings other than those expressly 
specified in the Rome Statute or the RPE.  This flexibility un-
doubtedly carries conceptual appeal, but it leaves a difficult ques-
tion unanswered.  What investigation-phase proceedings, other 
than those already identified in the Statute and the RPE, would suf-
ficiently affect the personal interests of a victim, without unduly 
prejudicing defense rights and efficient proceedings, such that par-
ticipation in those proceedings should be permitted?  Failure to an-
ticipate the answer to this question will perpetuate the resource 
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drain by again deferring complicated issues for future decision-
making.  In concrete terms, victims will continue to make requests 
relating to investigative strategies of the OTP, evidence-gathering, 
the protection of witnesses, their own protection, and their legal 
representation, to take some examples.  The Chambers will carry 
on sorting through, on a case-by-case basis, which of these investi-
gation-phase proceedings might or might not affect the personal 
interests of the applicants, and/or the fairness and efficiency of 
proceedings.  Clarity will again be delayed and the gap between 
victims’ expectations and the reality of actual participation will 
persist. 
¶117 To avoid the inefficiency of continuing to define participa-
tion through trial and error, the Chambers should confront, in ad-
vance, the question of whether there is any specific investigation-
phase proceeding in which it appears likely that: (1) a victim’s 
“personal” interests—as distinguished from the interests common 
to all victims within the scope of an investigation—will be af-
fected; and (2) the vindication of those interests will not be out-
weighed by fairness and efficiency concerns.  If consideration of 
this question leads to a continued inability to identify any proceed-
ing appropriate for participation, other than those in which victims’ 
participation is already required by the Statute and the RPE, the 
right to participate during the investigation should be pared to the 
terms of those governing documents.  If there are such proceed-
ings, they should be identified, and the reasoning articulated, to 
enable applicants to make informed decisions about whether and 
when to seek to participate in ICC proceedings. 
B. Define Participation in a Case to Be Limited to Victims of 
Charged Crimes 
¶118 In the context of cases, the sua sponte decision of Trial 
Chamber I to grant the “status of victim” to any victim of any 
crime within the situation, or investigation, should be reversed, as 
both the OTP and the defense have argued.264 
                                                 
264 See Defense Brief in Support of Appeal of Lubanga Trial Participation Deci-
sion, supra note 186, at 14 (seeking declaration that harm and personal interests 
of applicant must be linked to the charges against the accused); Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1219, Prosecution’s Docu-
ment in Support of Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s 18 January 2008 Decision 
on Victims’ Participation, Public, ¶ 51 (Mar. 10, 2008) (requesting reversal of 
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¶119 The legal reasons that Trial Chamber I’s ruling must be 
revisited have been cogently explored by Judge Blattman in his 
dissenting opinion.  Incorporating wholesale the definition of vic-
tims, as set forth in the U.N. Basic Principles, wrongly ignores the 
limit of the competence of the Court and the Trial Chamber, which 
is to adjudicate criminal cases.  For this reason, applicants to par-
ticipate in a case, or at trial, should not be deemed to have demon-
strated that the case or trial will affect their personal interests 
unless they are victims of the crimes being adjudicated by the 
Court. 
¶120 Observing the competence of the Court will again eliminate 
a two-step analysis which promises to be impossible to implement.  
As already discussed, in Part IV.C, it verges on folly to undertake 
to determine, on a case-by-case basis, and in relation to evidence 
which will change and develop, whether any of the thousands or 
millions of victims of a crime within a situation may have informa-
tion relevant to the evidence and issues to be addressed at trial. 
¶121 The Trial Chamber’s reason for expanding the definition of 
victim vis-à-vis a case is, in any event, a patently improper one.  
The Chamber has been frank in acknowledging that the purpose of 
the expansion is to permit the Chamber to qualify as “victims” any 
individuals who might be in a position to lead evidence, regardless 
of whether they suffered harm from the charged crimes.265  Not-
withstanding the understandable nature of the Chamber’s curiosity 
about the availability of evidence, the Chamber is not permitted 
under the Statute and the RPE to engage in investigation, to seek 
evidence from other than the parties, or to elevate the standing of 
victims to parties.  Moreover, as is suggested by Judge Blattman’s 
dissent and by the pendency of the appeal, the Trial Chamber can 
collect and select evidence only at the cost of raising controversy 
about the Court’s commitment to upholding the rights of accused 
persons and enforcing the Prosecution’s duty to meet the burden of 
proof. 
¶122 Returning to the standard endorsed by the Pre-Trial 
Chambers thus will restore two limits at once: a proper limit on 
participation and likewise on the function of the judiciary.  The 
majority decision of Trial Chamber I assumes a proposition which 
is highly doubtful, especially in advance of any completed trial at 
                                                                                                             
Trial Chamber I’s decision). 
265 See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.  
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the ICC: that the massive effort of seeking potential victims who 
could serve as witnesses would be repaid by evidence and informa-
tion that otherwise would not be presented in Court by the parties.  
It would be irrational, to say the least, to base ICC legal standards, 
and the expenditure of ICC resources, on this extreme and untested 
view.  More relevant, in any event, is that the Chambers are not 
entitled to use victims to enhance the evidence adduced by the 
Prosecutor or the defense.  The Trial Chamber’s power, and re-
course, is to find charges proven or not proven.  The Chamber 
should be limited to this remedy. 
C. Enforce More Rigorously The Requirement That The 
“Proceeding” in Question Have an Effect on “Personal Interests” 
¶123 Implicit in the measures being proposed is the recommenda-
tion that the Chambers assess more rigorously, in the context of 
both investigations and cases, the requirement in Article 68(3) that 
an applicant demonstrate that the “proceeding” in which he or she 
seeks to participate affects his or her “personal interests.” 
¶124 Pre-Trial Chamber I’s decision to equate an entire phase—
the investigation—with a “proceeding,” and then to find that “per-
sonal interests” of victims were affected in general by the investi-
gation proceeding was, as the parties have pointed out, the equiva-
lent of no meaningful determination at all. 
¶125 To fulfill the plain meaning of Article 68(3), and to create a 
system which promotes, rather than hinders, effective victim’s par-
ticipation, the two operative terms must be interpreted to have in-
dependent substance.  The Appeals Chamber has already given 
guidance that it would be correct to interpret the term “proceeding” 
far more narrowly than to signify an entire phase, such as investi-
gation.  Its ruling that victims who participated in the Lubanga 
confirmation hearing could not automatically participate in the 
proceeding to determine whether leave to appeal the decision con-
firming charges would be granted, implicitly recognizes two dis-
tinct “proceedings,” even between the hearing of a matter and an 
appeal on the same question.266  Second, applicants must be re-
quired to demonstrate an effect on “personal interests” more spe-
cific than an interest he or she shares with all or most of the vic-
tims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, such as to help 
                                                 
266 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. 
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to clarify facts or punish perpetrators.  The Appeals Chamber, 
again, seems inclined to endorse a more restrictive view of the re-
quirement, as in the past it has opined that the “personal interest” 
of the applicant, for example, should be one which does not “be-
long instead to the role assigned to the Prosecutor.”267 
¶126 Although the Appeals Chamber has not yet had the opportu-
nity to offer elaboration, these rulings suggest that the Chambers 
should strive, from the outset of their inquiries, to identify contri-
butions by participating victims that will be unique, or add incre-
mental value to the information already before the Chambers.  Par-
ticipating victims also should be affected by the proceeding at is-
sue in some more direct and tangible way than other victims of the 
investigated conflict or even of the charged crimes.  These re-
quirements are not a judgment that victims, if permitted to partici-
pate to a greater extent, would fail to make valuable contributions 
or to obtain a greater sense of redress.  Importantly, they should 
not be regarded as such.  Rather, the requirements reflect the 
judgment of the governing Statute to permit victims’ participation, 
while giving effect to the limitation of not impairing the core ob-
jective of providing fair and efficient Court proceedings. 
D. Within a Single-Stage Qualification Process, Limit in the Short 
Term the Proceedings in Which Participation will be Granted 
¶127 Even assuming that the thus-far unproductive step of 
granting of “the status of victim” were eliminated, that trial par-
ticipation was limited to victims whose harms are linked to the 
charges, and that the requirements of Article 68(3) were applied 
more rigorously, especially in the investigation phase, there re-
mains the fact that the Chambers will need to undertake case-by-
case determinations with respect to a potentially high number of 
applicants who may seek to participate in each specific pre-trial 
and trial proceedings, at a minimum.  A question persists about the 
extent to which the Chambers could successfully manage even a 
one-step process, if the remaining step does not eliminate the need 
for the judges to consider applications to participate in reference to 
numerous proceedings and their varied effects on “personal inter-
ests” of each of many applicants. 
                                                 
267 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  
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¶128 As is discussed supra in Part V.A, if the Court elects to 
retain any right to participation in investigation-phase proceedings, 
beyond the instances specified in the Statute and the RPE, it should 
simultaneously provide elaboration on the specific investigation-
phase proceedings in which participation is likely to be permit-
ted—and not permitted. 
¶129 In case proceedings, the same winnowing should take place.  
Even if the Chambers switched to evaluating, in one step and with 
respect to a specific case proceeding only, the effect of the pro-
ceeding on personal interests of the applicant and the consequences 
for fairness and efficiency, there is still the potential for any appli-
cant to seek to participate, for example, in every discovery or dis-
closure issue, every issue of victim or witness protection, and all 
hearings related to evidentiary challenges.  Unless the Chambers 
manage further the applications to participate in specific proceed-
ings, they will remain in the open-ended, resource-consuming loop 
of attempting to specify, from within some universe of potential 
instances of participation, the actual instances of participation that 
they will provide. 
¶130 It is therefore essential for the ICC to make known some 
initial, modest selections about which, if any, case proceedings, 
other than the ones specified in the Statute and the RPE, it expects 
to be occasions for victims’ participation.  The method would be to 
disseminate to applicants, in effect, rebuttable presumptions about 
the proceedings upon which their efforts to obtain participation 
should be focused.  The Chambers could in addition permit appli-
cants to demonstrate, on a timetable set by the Court, that a spe-
cific, upcoming proceeding not previously favored by the Court for 
participation is one in which participation should be allowed. 
¶131 To select and publicize certain proceedings in which 
participation presumptively will be allowed is dramatically less 
ambitious than the current system, but the depth of the resource 
drain resulting from the current framework, and its failure to de-
liver more concrete participation, demonstrates that victims’ par-
ticipation, at least initially, must be provided in a far more targeted 
way.  Narrowing the proceedings in which victims’ participation 
normally will be allowed will bring multiple benefits.  The Court 
will be able to provide more and better actual participation to vic-
tims.  Victims will obtain participation based on the merits of the 
applications, rather than the happenstance of having been among 
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the few who succeeded in having their applications heard.  Preju-
dice to defendants can be more meaningfully assessed if it arises in 
the context of instances of participation.  Finally, evaluating con-
crete requests in the context of a defined subset of proceedings also 
will afford the Court the opportunity to gain the experience that 
will enable it to assess whether, and at what pace, instances of vic-
tims’ participation should be expanded. 
¶132 It is fully feasible to define a list of proceedings in which 
participation would normally be envisioned, based on the Court’s 
experience.  It also turns out that this list comprises proceedings in 
which the interest of victims is immediately apparent.  Victims in 
the Lubanga proceeding, for example, have participated in pro-
ceedings held when, pursuant to Article 60(3), the Pre-Trial 
Chamber undertook the periodic review of its initial decision to 
detain Lubanga prior to trial.268  They participated in the confirma-
tion hearing269 and expressed views and concerns regarding the 
date of trial.270  When the Trial Chamber has taken up disclosure 
issues related to a system or court-wide practice in which victims 
will participate—such as the “e-Court protocol,” which sets the 
standards and methods by which the Court and the participants will 
record and exchange evidence at trial, and information about the 
evidence—victims participated.271  On the other hand, victims did 
not participate, and generally did not even seek to participate, in 
other issues relating to disclosure or evidence.272  The Pre-Trial 
                                                 
268 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-530-
tEN, Observations of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in Respect of 
the Application for Release Filed By the Defence, Public (Oct. 9, 2006). 
269 See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text. 
270 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-957-
tENG, Submissions on Preliminary Issues, Public, ¶¶ 3-5 (Sept. 24, 2007).  
271 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1127, 
Decision on the E-Court Protocol, Public, ¶¶ 7-8 (Trial Chamber I, Jan. 24, 
2008) (noting filings by victims’ representatives). 
272 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
658, Decision on the Prosecution Application Pursuant to Rule 81(2) of 3 No-
vember 2006, Public Redacted Version, 2 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Nov. 3, 2006); 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-679, Decision 
on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, Public, 3-5 
(Pre-Trial Chamber I, Nov. 8, 2006); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-718, Decision on Defence Requests for Disclosure 
of Materials, Public with Confidential Annex, 1-3 (Nov. 17, 2006); Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1097, Order on the Prose-
cution’s Applications for the Lifting of Redactions, Non-disclosure of Informa-
tion and Disclosure of Summary Evidence, Public, ¶¶ 1-5 (Trial Chamber I, Dec. 
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Chamber in the Lubanga case expressly excluded participation in 
the instances described above in Part III.C, when victims sought 
further information about the OTP investigation in the DRC,273 and 
also at hearings when it deemed that victims’ participation was 
unlikely to alter the matters under consideration.274 
¶133 Identifying a set of core proceedings from which to build 
victims’ participation begins to make apparent that the definition 
of the participation right need not be amorphous or haphazard.  
The current practice does nothing to facilitate the provision of even 
the instances or forms of participation that the Chambers and vic-
tims would agree should be prioritized.  Applicants routinely sub-
mit boilerplate containing a blunderbuss request to participate in 
all investigation, pre-trial, trial, and reparations proceedings.  The 
judges, for their part, have indulged in repeatedly offering some 
universe of participation possibilities, without reaching decisions 
about the permissibility of concrete participation in specific pro-
ceedings.  A participation system in which the judges and the vic-
tims each are speculating about the other’s preferences will never 
attain viability or fairness. 
¶134 The short-term goal is, then, is to promote clarity and 
efficiency by fostering the ability of the Court and the victims to 
match expectations about preferred forms of participation.  This in 
turn will permit a greater volume of views and concerns to be ex-
pressed, even if the number of proceedings in which those views 
are expressed is modest, at least initially.  The next set of chal-
lenges relating to victims’ participation and reparations awaits, in-
cluding, for example, the task of determining to what extent vic-
tims will have common or diverse interests, how representation can 
effectively be provided when interests are not unified, and the 
principles upon which reparations will be rewarded.  This circum-
                                                                                                             
18, 2007); Transcript in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06-T-69-ENG, at 40-63 (Jan. 10, 2008) (parties’ arguments regarding 
OTP’s applications for the lifting of redactions, non-disclosure of evidence, and 
disclosure of summary evidence). 
273 See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text. 
274 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-335-
tENG, Decision on the Application for Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to 
a/0003/06 in the Status Conference of 24 August 2006, Public, 3 (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Aug. 17, 2006) (deciding that because status conference concerns 
only technical issues relating to system of disclosure in effect among the Prose-
cution, Defence and Registry, victims are not authorized to participate in the 
conference). 
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stance makes it even more crucial to lay a sound foundation, at a 
minimum, for resolving the basic question of the proper scope of 
the participation right. 
VI. CONSIDERATIONS FOR VICTIMS AND VICTIMS’ 
REPRESENTATIVES 
¶135 Finally, the experience of the ICC in attempting to imple-
ment meaningful victims’ participation presents lessons for victims 
and victims’ representatives.  Victims are entitled to insist that the 
ICC improve its record of providing concrete and effective forms 
of participation, and there are steps victims can take to assist in 
attaining that goal.  In addition, the record of the past years con-
firms that victims must be cautious about coming to regard ICC 
proceedings as the sole or primary means by which they should 
raise views and concerns, or seek justice, accountability, and repa-
rations.  The design of the Rome Statute, and the practical limita-
tions on the Court, make it unlikely that more than a minute per-
centage of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, 
save those who have some direct connection to the crimes being 
adjudicated in the Court, can count on obtaining a “day in court” at 
the ICC.  In addition, the ICC is intended as a court of complemen-
tarity: a court that supplements and promotes the efforts of other 
courts.  For these reasons, it is important that, in addition to par-
ticipating in ICC proceedings, victims capitalize on the existence 
of ICC investigations and cases to promote and demand comple-
mentary efforts, including domestic efforts, to bring justice.  Vic-
tims will not fail to obtain an unprecedented degree of participation 
in ICC proceedings, but the interests of all victims of atrocities will 
better and more equitably be served if participation in ICC pro-
ceedings routinely serves as a jumping-off point for promoting re-
storative justice in other courts and fora. 
A. Requesting Better Responsiveness from the ICC 
¶136 Victims, victim representatives, and other interested Court 
observers should communicate with the Court, as part of approved 
participation; through reports, publications or articles; or by appro-
priate contacts to Court staff, to urge the Court to: (1) be more 
prompt in processing and deciding applications to participate; (2) 
be more transparent in disseminating likely timelines and prospects 
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for concrete participation in proceedings; and (3) attempt to reach 
more unified and clear standards for victims’ participation.  Vic-
tims and their representatives will also undoubtedly be able to sug-
gest specific measures for improving the victim participation 
scheme.  Finally, to the extent that applicants believe that they are 
failing to obtain the degree of participation they expected, the ex-
pectations gap should be described to the Court, so that there can 
be analysis and understanding on both sides of why the gap exists, 
and measures can be adapted to close the gap, if appropriate. 
B. Prioritizing Whether to Seek Participation, and Forms of 
Participation Sought 
¶137 As is suggested above, victims will be better able to obtain 
participation if they are clear about which instances and forms of 
participation they are seeking. 
¶138 In the first instance, each victim should consider, in relation 
to the factual context he or she confronts, whether participation in 
court proceedings is a productive means of vindicating his or her 
personal rights and interests.  While there is understandable inter-
est in participating in the ICC’s proceedings, arguably that interest 
has wrongly diverted energies from other victim-based initiatives, 
equally important to obtaining restorative justice for victims.  Con-
spicuous examples are presented by the Darfur and Uganda cases.  
None of the defendants named in those two cases has successfully 
been arrested, and the ICC itself has no power to effectuate arrest.  
Victim advocacy to states, the U.N. and other international, re-
gional, and domestic authorities could play a critical role in gener-
ating support for arrest efforts, which in the ICC system must be 
carried out by states.  Victims thus logically should weigh whether 
it better serves their interests to stand in line to participate in ICC 
proceedings or to organize advocacy in support of arrest efforts 
and directed at states or other entities.  Victims also could logically 
prioritize bringing public attention to the accounts of victims, as a 
means of promoting grass-roots support for arrest and transfer. 
¶139 Equally important is for victims to identify the ICC 
proceedings in which they have the greatest interest in participat-
ing.  The blunderbuss approach to requesting participation in all 
proceedings thus far has impeded the conferring of participation 
rights, and it also suggests that victims are not considering, in other 
than abstract terms, the desirability of participation.  Consideration 
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of how and in what ways a victim wants to participate, or is willing 
to participate, is important to ensuring that the interests of victims 
are not ultimately disserved.  In the Darfur situation, for example, a 
recent media report has quoted the victims’ representatives for the 
twenty-one applicants whose applications were considered by the 
Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber I as having stated that the ap-
plicants at issue preferred to participate in trials.275  The same rep-
resentatives noted the difficulty in explaining to the victims they 
represent why it has been so difficult to obtain decisions on their 
applications to participate.276  The missed opportunities here are in 
part the responsibility of the Court, but it also is incumbent on vic-
tims’ representatives, particularly as the process becomes clearer, 
to explain likely outcomes and timetables to victims.  In the Darfur 
case, the twenty-one applicants waited for between six months and 
a year to learn only the dispositions of their requests to participate 
in the situation, because the Single Judge deferred considering any 
trial participation.  Had the applicants understood the limits of po-
tential participation in an investigation, or made clearer their pref-
erence to participate at trial, it is entirely possible that they would 
have obtained by now the determinations in which they had the 
higher interest. 
C. Guarding Against the Circumstance that the Prospect of ICC 
Participation Distracts From Other Important Means of 
Expressing Views and Concerns and Obtaining Justice 
¶140 Because it is unlikely that the ICC can serve as an effective 
forum for any but a small portion of victims of conflicts, victims 
and their representatives should consider that a focus on obtaining 
participation in ICC proceedings may wrongly detract from efforts 
to pursue other methods of raising and promoting victims’ voices.  
ICC participation has been granted only slowly, in a limited fash-
ion, and in highly unpredictable ways, and it is unlikely that reform 
will bring any dramatic alteration of this scenario, at least in the 
short term.  ICC participation also, of necessity, will be concen-
trated on participation relevant to the ICC’s cases, which are ex-
tremely selective, or the issues raised in those cases.  It is thus im-
portant that victims avoid over-estimating the responsiveness of 
                                                 
275 See VRWG Article re Darfur Applicants, supra note 7. 
276 See id. 
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the ICC victim participation system, or the degree of expression or 
vindication that can be obtained through that system, especially 
insofar as victims seek to express views and concerns that relate 
broadly to conflicts, their causes, and their consequences and costs. 
¶141 Victims might better promote victims’ interests by using the 
interest and profile created by the ICC investigation itself, and not 
solely the participation right, as a means of raising victims’ voices 
about mass crimes.  The objective should be to capitalize on the 
ICC’s investigation and use it as a platform for the expression of 
victims’ views and concerns either about crimes prosecuted by the 
Court, or crimes not prosecuted by the Court but within the same 
conflict or investigation.  Victims vis-à-vis the conflict could use 
the ICC’s intervention, for example, as a basis to advocate for do-
mestic prosecutions of like crimes.  The ICC intervention also 
makes it more likely that international media will have an interest 
in victims’ accounts and issues that are important to victims but 
beyond the mandate of the ICC.  This opportunity should be fully 
exploited so that, for example, the ICC intervention can promote 
exploration of such issues as the humanitarian crises caused by the 
displacement of victim populations. 
¶142 Victims also should not neglect to target states and interna-
tional organizations in expressing views about conflicts and the 
crimes they engender, to ensure that victims’ views are not ne-
glected when these entities are called upon to cooperate with the 
ICC or to initiate or aid other efforts to mete justice.  Victims’ ad-
vocates should continue to use ICC investigations as a basis for 
using technologies to promote dialogues enabling victims to share 
and exchange accounts of their victimization and questions about 
justice.  The directors of a project called “Interactive Radio for Jus-
tice,” for example, have travelled to the DRC and the CAR to re-
cord and broadcast via radio victims’ accounts and their questions, 
concerns, and hopes about justice in general and the ICC in par-
ticular.  These accounts are then publicized again through the 
internet and are “answered” by radio broadcasts and “web-posts” 
of ICC personnel responding to the victims’ statements and ques-
tions.277 
¶143 The point is that the ICC intervention can promote varied 
means of raising victims’ voices, and the objective more produc-
                                                 
277 The Interactive Radio For Justice website can be viewed at www.irfj.org (last 
visited June 11, 2008). 
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tively could be viewed—given the narrowness of ICC proceed-
ings—as one of connecting victims to the cause of justice rather 
than to an ability to participate specifically in an ICC proceeding. 
D. Share and Disseminate Accurate Information About ICC 
Participation 
¶144 Outreach efforts carried out by the Court and by NGOs in the 
field have been extensive, and predictably one of the great chal-
lenges has been disseminating information about the ICC and its 
authority and capabilities, in light of a general lack of knowledge, 
or affirmative misunderstandings, about the ICC and its work.  On 
the topic of victims’ participation, it is critical that the Court, vic-
tims’ representatives, and other interested observers implement 
educational and outreach initiatives which provide victims and af-
fected communities with concrete information, based in the ICC’s 
experience to date, about the ICC’s authority and activities, the 
likely limit of its work, the forms and likelihood of victims’ par-
ticipation, and the potential for reparations.  It is now possible to 
provide specific information which victims are likely to find im-
portant: statistics about forms of participation sought and obtained, 
the forms of identification that applicants for participation are like-
ly required to submit, or the prospects that a victim can participate 
in confirmation or trial proceedings while maintaining anonymity.  
While there are many reasons to keep the interchange of informa-
tion up-to-date, the most significant is that victims are entitled to 
make informed decisions about their own interactions with the 
Court.  The fact that the vast majority of applicants for participa-
tion seem to view all options as equal is a disturbing indication that 
they are not currently receiving adequate information or guidance 
about the choices available to them. 
E. Exercise Clear Rights to Participate 
¶145 Finally, victims and victims’ representatives should take care 
that energies devoted to broadening hypothetical rights, or trans-
forming the “status of victim” to instances of actual participation, 
do not divert from expressing “views and concerns” in ways and in 
proceedings that the Rome Statute and the RPE clearly and un-
equivocally identify.  The Statute and the RPE specifically author-
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ize participation in a number of proceedings, and also identify 
mechanisms by which victims can obtain the participation. 
¶146 Victims can easily avail themselves of some of these core 
participation rights by the simple step of “communicating” with 
the Court.  For example, under the Statute and RPE, individuals 
who have “communicated” with the Court are eligible to receive 
notice of the Prosecutor’s decisions not to investigate or prosecute 
under Article 53,278 challenges to jurisdiction and admissibility,279 
and Court decisions to hold confirmation hearings.280  Thus, vic-
tims who are interested in expressing views and concerns on these 
occasions should be encouraged to submit the triggering communi-
cations. 
¶147 Similarly, it would be fruitful for victims and victims’ 
representatives to prioritize plans to gather and express views and 
concerns in proceedings which are highly likely to occur and in 
which victims’ views must be sought, by express direction of the 
Statute and the RPE.  The Lubanga confirmation hearing, for ex-
ample, was widely seen as a victory (and a very high-profile one) 
for the cause of victim participation, because victims and their rep-
resentatives dramatically demonstrated the unique value of the ex-
pression of victims’ views and concerns.  In a similar fashion, vic-
tims’ views, for example, are likely to be critical if the admissibil-
ity of the Darfur case is challenged by the Sudanese Government, 
or if “interests of justice” applications are brought to the Chamber 
assigned to the Uganda case, in light of peace talks between the 
Lord’s Resistance Army and the Ugandan government.  These pro-
ceedings will determine if ICC trials of accused persons ever take 
place in those cases.  For this reason, it would be astute for victims 
and their representatives to plan for participation in these proceed-
                                                 
278 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 53(1)(c) & 51(2)(c) (Prosecutor may 
choose not to investigate or prosecute on grounds of interest of justice); RPE, 
supra note 17, R. 92(2) (in order to allow participation, the Court shall notify 
victims concerning the decision of the Prosecutor not to prosecute pursuant to 
Article 53). 
279 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 19 (Court, parties, and states may seek 
determinations on admissibility) & art. 53(1)(c); RPE, supra note 17, R. 
59(1)(b) (Registrar should inform victims who have communicated with the 
Court of any question or challenge of jurisdiction or admissibility). 
280 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 61 (entitled “Confirmation of the 
Charges Before Trial”); RPE, supra note 17, R. 92(3) (in order to allow partici-
pation, the Court shall notify victims of decisions to hold confirmation hear-
ings). 
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ings first, and to file applications to participate in trial after it has 
been ascertained that trials will indeed occur. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
¶148 The great experiment of incorporating victims’ participation 
into international criminal proceedings has had important suc-
cesses.  Moreover, the best of intentions, and a willingness to de-
vote vast amounts of time and energy, feed the continuing efforts 
to make the venture a productive one for victims and for interna-
tional criminal justice together.  For the reasons discussed, it re-
mains the case that the experiment is ongoing.  The judges of the 
International Criminal Trial for Rwanda predicted, in the course of 
determining not to undertake to provide reparations to victims at 
that court, that such a scheme “would not be efficacious, would 
severely hamper the everyday work of the Tribunal and would be 
highly destructive to the principal mandate of the Tribunal.”281  
The specter of this prediction proving true for the ICC victim par-
ticipation scheme cannot entirely be discounted.  A consideration 
of empirical outcomes, prompt correction of courses found to be 
unproductive, and the exercise of discipline in estimating the 
Court’s true capacity, will be critical—and would always have 
been necessary—to successful implementation of an innovative 
victim participation scheme.  In addition, the value of achieving 
modest short-term goals, to preserve possibilities of providing 
more extensive forms of participation in the longer term, both at 
the ICC and elsewhere, should never be underestimated.  To do no 
harm to the aspiration of restorative justice for victims should be 
the first principle.  Constructing a sound foundation for further ef-
forts to serve the dignity and well-being of victims of mass crimes 
would be precisely the attainment to which the drafters of the 
Rome Statute aspired. 
 
 
                                                 
281 WCRO Report, supra note 6, at 12 n.31 (quoting Letter dated 9 November 
2000 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General, annexed to Letter of the UN Secretary-General 
to the Security Council dated 14 December 2000, U.N. Doc S.2000/1198).  
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(Notes to Chart: Adjudication of Applications to Participate) 
 
i See text discussion infra in Part III.A (explaining how figures were derived). 
For the numbers assigned in the DRC situation, see Prosecutor v. Germain Ka-
tanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC/01/04-01/07, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0327/07 to 
a/0337/07 and a/0001/08, Public, 2 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Apr. 2, 2008) ) [here-
inafter Decision re Katanga Case Participation] (noting applicant number 
a/0337/07 and a/0001/08). Only one number has been assigned with an “08” 
suffix  (a/0001/08) and there appear to have been a total of 337 applicants in the 
DRC situation in the years 2006 and 2007, because no number from 1 to 337 is 
duplicated in those years, despite the change in suffix from “06” to “07.” See 
also 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, at 1 (referencing six addi-
tional applicants in the DRC situation, given designations VPRS 1 to VPRS 6).  
In the Uganda situation, see 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, at 
1 (noting applicant number a/0127/06 in the Uganda situation). For the Darfur 
situation, see 6 December 2007 Darfur Decision, supra note 82, at 1 (noting 
applicant number a/0038/07 in the Darfur situation).  
 
ii The figure for the DRC situation is summed from the decisions calling for ob-
servations of the parties: Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-73, 
Decision on Protective Measures Requested by Applicants 01/04-1/dp to 01/04-
6/dp, Public Redacted Version, 2-3 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, July 21, 2005) (au-
thorizing filing of observations regarding applicants who later were designated 
“VPRS 1” to “VPRS 6,” see 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, at 4 
n.4);  Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-147, Decision Appointing 
Ad Hoc Counsel and Establishing a Deadline for the Prosecution and Ad Hoc 
Counsel to Submit Observations on the Applications of Applicants a/0001/06 to 
a/0003/06, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, May 18, 2006); Situation in the DRC, 
Situation No. ICC-01/04-228, Décision autorisant le dépôt d’observations sur les 
demandes de participation à la procédure a/0004/06 à a/0009/06, a/0016/06 à 
a/0063/06 et a/0071/06, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Sept. 22, 2006); Situation 
in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-241, Décision autorisant le dépôt 
d’observations sur les demandes de participation à la procédure a/0072/06 à 
a/0080/06 et a/0105/06, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Sept. 29, 2006); 23 May 
2007 DRC Decision Authorizing Observations, supra note 147 (calling for ob-
servations on seventy-five applications); Situation in the DRC, Situation No. 
ICC-01/04-358, Decision authorising the filing of observations on applications 
for participation in the proceedings, Public (Pre-Trial Chamber I, July 17, 2007) 
(calling for observations on twenty-five applications); Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-182, Decision Authorising the Filing of 
Observations on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings a/0327/07 
to a/0337/07 and a/0001/08, Public (Feb. 7, 2008) (calling for observations on 
twelve applications to participate in case).  
iii These numbers are drawn from the decisions adjudicating participation rights. 
In the DRC situation, see 17 January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, at 41 




(granting six applicants, VPRS 1 to VPRS 6, status of victim vis-à-vis situation); 
Situation in the DRC, Situation No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr, Corrigendum à la « 
Décision sur les demandes de participation à la procédure deposées dans le cadre 
de l’enquête en République démocratique du Congo par a/0004/06 à a/0009/06, 
a/0016/06 à a/0063/06 a/0071/06 à a/0080/06 et a/0105/06 à a/0110/06, 
a/0188/06, a/0128/06 à a/0162/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06, a/0209/06, a/0214/06, 
a/0220/06 à a/0222/06, a/0224/06, a/0227/06, a/0230/06, a/0234/06 à a/0236/06, 
a/0240/06, a/0225/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 à a/0233/06, a/0237/06 à a/0239/06 
et a/0241/06 à a/0250/06 », Public, 57-58 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Jan. 31, 2008) 
[hereinafter Second Decision re DRC Situation Participation] (correcting deci-
sion initially issued on December 24, 2007, and granting sixty-eight applications 
to participate in the investigation, including a/0105/06); Decision re Katanga 
Case Participation, supra n. i, at 13 (granting five applicants the status of victim 
vis-à-vis the situation).  For decisions relating to the Lubanga  and Katanga 
cases, see 20 October 2006 Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 13 (grant-
ing one applicant, a/0105/06, the status of case victim); 31 July 2006 Lubanga  
Case Decision, supra note 43, at 16 (granting three applicants, a/0001/06, 
a/0002/06 and  a/0003/06, the status of victim vis-à-vis case and situation); De-
cision re Katanga Case Participation, supra n. i, at 13 (granting five applicants 
the status of victim vis-à-vis the case). Note that in the DRC situation, unlike in 
the Uganda situation, victims vis-à-vis the case are automatically considered to 
have obtained the status of victim in the investigation.  See id. at 13.  For the 
Uganda situation, see 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, at 61 
(six applicants granted the right to participate in the case, two in the situation, 
and one of these granted participation rights in both case and situation); Second 
Decision re Uganda Participation, supra note 74, at 70 (granting eight victims 
right to participate in case, seven in situation; two of these were admitted in both 
case and situation).  In the Darfur situation, the single decision issued thus far 
granted eleven applicants the status of victim vis-à-vis the situation only.  See 6 
December 2007 Darfur Decision, supra note 82, at 23. 
 
iv Second Decision re DRC Situation Participation, supra n. iii, ¶¶ 23, 24 & 58 
(adjudging as improper two applications and denying third, insofar as it sought 
participation in investigation); DRC Decision on Case Participation of VPRS 1 
to VPRS 6, supra note 41, at 8-9 (denying requests of VPRS 1 to 6 to participate 
in case); 20 October 2006 Lubanga Case Decision, supra note 43, at 13 (denying 
fifty-eight applications insofar as they sought participation in case); Decision re 
Katanga Case Participation, supra n. i, at 13 (denying six applicants the status of 
victim vis-à-vis the case); 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, ¶¶ 
138-44 (implicitly denying participation in case to an applicant granted status of 
victim in investigation); Second Decision re Uganda Participation, supra note 
74, ¶¶ 75-81, 91-97, 130-36, 167-73 & p. 70 (expressly denying one applicant 
status of victim in investigation; implicitly denying applications of four others 
who were admitted to participate in the situation); 6 December 2007 Darfur De-
cision, supra note 82, at 23 & ¶¶ 31, 33 (denying ten applicants status of victim 
in situation but also characterizing three of the ten applications rejected as in-
complete). 
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v The figures in this column are derived by subtracting the number of applica-
tions granted or denied, in the situation and case respectively, from the applica-
tions forwarded to the Chamber.   
   
vi In the Uganda situation, the Chamber has thirty-seven applications pending in 
both the situation and case, despite the granting of the status of victim vis-à-vis 
the situation to fifteen of forty-nine applicants, and the denying of the status of 
victim to fifteen of forty-nine applicants, because three of the same applicants 
were granted participation rights in both the situation and case. See 10 August 
2007 Decision, supra note 47, at 61 (six applicants granted the right to partici-
pate in the case, two in the situation, and one of these granted participation 
rights in both the case and situation); Second Decision re Uganda Participation, 
supra note 74, at 70 (granting eight victims right to participate in the case, seven 
in the situation; two of these were admitted in both the case and situation).  
 
vii In the Darfur situation, all twenty-one applications considered by the Chamber 
thus far have been deferred and therefore remain pending, insofar as the case is 
concerned.  See 6 December 2007 Darfur Decision, supra note 82, ¶ 8. 
 
viii These dates are contained in the decisions rendered by the Chambers.  See 17 
January 2006 DRC Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 2 (VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 filed appli-
cations to participate in June 2005); Second Decision re DRC Situation Partici-
pation, supra n. iii, at 3 (most recently filed application under consideration was 
filed in April 2007); Decision re Katanga Case Participation, supra n. i, at 2 
(twelve applications under consideration were filed by the Registry on January 
30, 2008); 10 August 2007 Uganda Decision, supra note 47, at 2-3 (forty-nine 
applications under consideration were filed between June 2006 and November 
2006); 6 December 2007 Darfur Decision, supra note 82, at 3, 5 (twenty-one 
applications under consideration were filed either in June 2006 or July 2007). 
 
